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In the first analysis of this dissertation, I assess the water use savings and cost-
effectiveness of the Conservation Reserve Enhancement Program (CREP) in the 
Upper Arkansas River basin in Kansas, a water rights retirement program aimed at 
reducing depletion of the High Plains Aquifer. First, I use a fixed effects model with 
matched samples of farmers to determine the effect of CREP on water use. I find that for 
every unit of authorized water use retired in CREP, 0.8 units of water are saved per year. 
Second, I examine how a rights retirement program would perform outside of the policy 
region and how the existing program design could be improved upon. I estimate a probit 
regression to determine which factors most influence the probability that a farmer enrolls 
in CREP. Using the results of the probit regression, I then simulate enrollment decisions 
outside of the policy region to assess the cost-effectiveness of different incentive designs. 
I find that programs that pay incentives based on past levels of water extraction save 
  
water more cheaply than programs that pay based on acreage retired. I also find that 
programs such as CREP that offer higher incentive rates to farmers that enroll later are 
more efficient than programs that never increase rates.  
In the second analysis, coauthors and I assess the household value for stream 
restoration, a common approach used by local governments to mitigate the water 
quality impacts of urban stormwater. We conduct a choice experiment in the 
Baltimore metro region to examine household willingness to pay (WTP) for stream 
restoration. We vary the land ownership of restoration locations and the distance from 
households to streams in hypothetical choice scenarios that include changes in several 
stream restoration attributes. Our results indicate that household WTP for 
improvements in stream bank stabilization and nutrient reduction are positive and 
significant on public and private land across all distances. We find significant 
heterogeneity in WTP across land ownership and proximity to a stream. This 
heterogeneity in WTP can be of particular interest to policy makers when making 

































Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the  
University of Maryland, College Park, in partial fulfillment 
of the requirements for the degree of 













Professor Lars Olson, Co-Chair 
Associate Professor David Newburn, Co-Chair 
Professor Erik Lichtenberg 
Assistant Professor Jorge Holzer 
























© Copyright by 













The ninth and tenth chapters of the following dissertation are jointly authored with 
David A. Newburn and Charles A. Towe. The Dissertation Committee acknowledges 







I have received an immense amount of support in completing this dissertation. First 
and foremost, I would like to thank my wife Susan, who has been by my side in this 
process from the beginning. Her continual positivity has helped me to stay on track 
during the most difficult parts of this process. I would also like to thank my parents. 
They have provided me with insight and advice when I’ve needed it and are always 
there to listen. 
Next, I would like to thank my co-chairs. David Newburn for the countless 
hours he has devoted to working with me, helping me to learn to be a better 
researcher and writer. Also for funding me for three years and asking me to 
participate in several research projects. I have benefited immensely from these 
experiences. Lars Olson for reading countless drafts of my work and always 
providing comments that help me to see for myself what questions I should be asking. 
Also for encouraging me to make strong economic arguments and to own my 
research. I would also like to thank Erik Lichtenberg, Jorge Holzer and Anna Alberini 
for always providing challenging feedback. I would like to thank Maureen Cropper 
for graciously devoting time to serve in my committee despite her many other 
commitments. Finally, I would like to thank Stephen Salant for encouraging me to 
pursue my interests and helping me to develop new economic ideas around them. 
I would like to thank Daniel Voica for always having words of wisdom. 
Thank you also to my friends and colleagues. This includes Cyrus, Youpei, Uttara, 





who have always helped me with my constant barrage of questions. This includes Jeff 
Cunningham, Katherine Faulkner, Pin-Wuan Lin, Dany Burns and Ally Delgado.  
Several external people or organizations were also particularly helpful. I 
would like to thank several individuals from the state of Kansas for providing data, 
helpful insights and other assistance whenever I requested it. I couldn’t have 
completed this dissertation otherwise. This includes Steve Frost, Alex Whitesell and 
Ginger Pugh from the Department of Agriculture and Brownie Wilson from the 
Kansas Geological Survey. I would also like to thank the many individuals who 
provided helpful input for the stream restoration survey. Finally, I would like to thank 





Table of Contents 
 
Foreword ....................................................................................................................... ii 
Acknowledgements ...................................................................................................... iii 
Table of Contents .......................................................................................................... v 
List of Tables ............................................................................................................... vi 
List of Figures ............................................................................................................. vii 
Chapter 1: Introduction ................................................................................................. 1 
Chapter 2: Do Water Rights Retirement Programs Effectively Reduce Irrigation? ..... 7 
Chapter 3: Water Management, Additionality and Cost-Effectiveness ...................... 12 
Chapter 4: Water in Kansas and the Conservation Reserve Enhancement Program .. 18 
Chapter 5: Data for Analysis of CREP ....................................................................... 25 
Chapter 6:  Methods Used in CREP Analysis ............................................................ 33 
6.1. Effects of CREP on Water Use ........................................................................ 33 
6.2. Targeting for Water Use .................................................................................. 37 
6.3. Evaluating Cost-Effectiveness of Water Rights Retirement Policies .............. 42 
Chapter 7:  Results of CREP Analysis ........................................................................ 59 
7.1. Fixed Effects .................................................................................................... 59 
7.2. Probability of Enrollment and Simulation ....................................................... 75 
7.3. Policy Discussion ............................................................................................. 85 
Chapter 8: Conclusions ............................................................................................... 91 
Chapter 9: Household Willingness to Pay for Stream Restoration on Public and 
Private Land: Evidence from the Baltimore Metropolitan Region ............................. 94 
9.1. Introduction ...................................................................................................... 94 
9.2. Policy Background on Stream Restoration ...................................................... 97 
9.3. Econometric Model ........................................................................................ 102 
9.4. Household Survey Design and Data .............................................................. 108 
9.4.1. Data ......................................................................................................... 108 
9.4.2. Survey Design ......................................................................................... 110 
9.5. Results ............................................................................................................ 115 
9.5.1. Sample Selection ..................................................................................... 115 
9.5.2. Estimation Results .................................................................................. 118 
9.6. Conclusion ..................................................................................................... 126 
Chapter 10: Stream Restoration Survey .................................................................... 129 
10.1. Additional Survey Response Statistics ........................................................ 129 
10.2. Survey Instrument Example ......................................................................... 136 














List of Tables 
 
Table 4.1: Upper Arkansas River CREP enrollment statistics ................................... 24 
Table 5.1: Description and Sources of Data ............................................................... 26 
Table 5.2: Summary Statistics of Water Rights .......................................................... 32 
Table 5.3: Summary Statistics at Usage Unit Level ................................................... 32 
Table 6.1: Comparison of Enrollment Regression Sample and Simulation Sample .. 48 
Table 6.2: Overview of Simulations Used in Cost-Effectiveness Calculations.......... 51 
Table 6.3: Overview of Policies Assessed in Cost-Effectiveness Comparison .......... 52 
Table 7.1: Difference in Means of All Enrolled and Unenrolled Water Units in CREP 
Region ......................................................................................................................... 61 
Table 7.2: Difference in Means of Enrolled and Caliper Matched Unenrolled Units 62 
Table 7.3: Effect of AF per Acre Retired in CREP on AF per Acre Water Use of 
Water Unit (Caliper Matched) .................................................................................... 65 
Table 7.4: Effect of Proportion of Acreage Retired in CREP on AF per Acre Water 
Use of Water Unit (Caliper Matched) ......................................................................... 66 
Table 7.5: Water Unit Propensity to Enroll Some Acres ............................................ 69 
Table 7.6: Difference in Means of Enrolled and Propensity Matched Unenrolled Units
..................................................................................................................................... 70 
Table 7.7: Effect of AF per Acre Retired in CREP on AF per Acre Water Use of 
Water Unit (Propensity Matched) ............................................................................... 72 
Table 7.8: Effect of Proportion of Acreage Retired in CREP on AF per Acre Water 
Use of Water Unit (Propensity Matched) ................................................................... 73 
Table 7.9: Binary Choice Regressions of CREP Enrollment ..................................... 77 
Table 7.10: Cost-Effectiveness of Simulated Policies ................................................ 78 
Table 7.11: Sample Statistics of Perfect Foresight Policy Simulations ...................... 83 
Table 7.12: Regression of Cost per AF Saved on Total Water Savings ..................... 84 
Table 9.1: Attributes and Levels of Choice Questions ............................................. 113 
Table 9.2: Probit Model of Participation in Survey .................................................. 116 
Table 9.3: Results of Conditional Logit, Weighted Conditional Logit and Mixed Logit 
Models....................................................................................................................... 119 
Table 9.4: Marginal WTP of Restoration Attributes for Weighted Conditional Logit 
Model ........................................................................................................................ 121 
Table 9.5: Marginal WTP of Restoration Attributes for Mixed Logit Model .......... 124 
Table 9.6: Marginal WTP of Restoration Attributes for Conditional Logit Model .. 125 
Table 10.1: Survey Respondents by Sampling Region ............................................. 129 
Table 10.2: Sample Means for Survey Respondents and Non-Respondents ............ 131 
Table 10.3: Demographic Characteristics of Survey Respondents ........................... 132 
Table 10.4: Behavior Characteristics of Survey Respondents .................................. 134 





List of Figures 
 
Figure 4.1: Estimated usable lifetime of High Plain Aquifer in Kansas ..................... 19 
Figure 4.2: The High Plains Aquifer and CREP policy region ................................... 23 
Figure 5.1: Relationship between water rights, places of use, wells and water usage 
units ............................................................................................................................. 30 
Figure 6.1: Distribution of profits and water use and optimal targeting ..................... 40 
Figure 6.2: Comparison of distributions of continuous variables for regression and 
simulation samples ...................................................................................................... 49 
Figure 7.1: Use per acre over time for treatment and unmatched controls ................. 60 
Figure 7.2: Use per acre over time for treatment and caliper matched controls ......... 63 
Figure 7.3: Use per acre over time for treatment and caliper matched controls, late 
and early enrollments .................................................................................................. 67 
Figure 7.4: Use per acre over time for treatment and propensity score matched 
controls ........................................................................................................................ 71 
Figure 7.5: Use per acre over time for treatment and propensity score matched 
controls, late and early enrollments ............................................................................ 74 
Figure 7.6: Water savings supply curve for all rights ................................................. 82 
Figure 7.7: Cost savings from increasing rates, with and without anticipation effects
..................................................................................................................................... 88 
Figure 9.1: Stream restorations on public and private land in Baltimore City and 
County ....................................................................................................................... 100 






Chapter 1: Introduction 
Water managers are faced with the formidable task of ensuring that water is in 
adequate supply and condition for a variety of competing purposes. Some purposes of 
water, such as hydroelectric power, simply demand its plentiful flow. However, many 
others such as recreation, drinking water, or ecological uses also require that water is 
of a certain quality. In a simple world, economic efficiency would be the main 
consideration for managing water scarcity and quality. However, in practice other 
considerations hold sway and water resources are managed inefficiently over both 
space and time. 
A few factors make it difficult to manage water efficiently. First, in places like 
the United States, existing institutions and land use patterns are suboptimal for 
managing water scarcity and quality. Property rights systems fail to efficiently 
allocate water amongst potential uses over space and time, and existing land use 
patterns and agricultural practices fail to provide an adequate level of water quality. 
Second, profit or utility-maximizing individuals have little incentive to help provide 
the socially efficient levels of water use and quality. Water users rarely pay a price 
that reflects the true social value of water and thus they do not use water efficiently 
over space or time. Further, land owners or developers whose land use decisions 
adversely impact water quality have little incentive to change their practices. These 
individuals resist taxes or regulations and in effect these policies are relatively rare.  
Despite these difficulties, water managers still must find ways to conserve 
limited water supplies and improve water quality. To overcome the institutional and 





policies. Incentive-based policies can help to achieve water management goals, but 
can also have perverse consequences. For example, policies have been implemented 
which help farmers pay the cost of adopting efficient irrigation technology. Although 
in some cases more efficient irrigation systems can reduce water consumption, in 
other cases they can increase consumption (Pfeiffer and Lin 2014). Managers must 
carefully consider the direct and indirect impacts of incentive-based policies to ensure 
that they can achieve management goals effectively. When possible, managers may 
prefer to avoid private decision makers altogether. However, this may be too limiting. 
For example, if water managers only manage stormwater that runs through public 
land, they will likely fail to achieve water quality goals, as most water flows through 
private property.  
In this dissertation, I assess some of the impacts of current policies aimed at 
achieving water management goals, with an eye towards informing the design of 
more efficient future policy. I assess two current policies for managing water use and 
quality, respectively. In chapters two through eight, I analyze the water use savings 
and cost-effectiveness of the Conservation Reserve Enhancement Program (CREP) in 
the Upper Arkansas River basin in Kansas, a water rights retirement program aimed 
at reducing depletion of the High Plains Aquifer. Water rights retirement programs 
provide incentives for farmers willing to voluntarily stop irrigating their land. I find 
that CREP offers a viable way to manage a depleting aquifer and I consider ways that 
management using similar mechanisms can be made more cost-effective in the future. 
In chapters nine and ten, coauthors and I analyze the household willingness to pay for 





quality. This analysis aims to identify how the benefits of restoration vary across the 
landscape. The results may help to inform future policy decisions about where the 
benefits from stream restoration are highest. 
My first analysis focuses on a promising groundwater management approach 
that could help to make water use more efficient in many areas of the world. 
Groundwater accounts for 94% of all freshwater resources and many of the world’s 
most highly productive aquifers are rapidly depleting. Climate change as well as 
rising food demands from increasing population and incomes will increase the need 
for groundwater to irrigate cropland. Meanwhile, most areas allocate groundwater 
inefficiently, using a queuing system such as prior appropriation (Schoengold and 
Zilberman 2007). In prior appropriation, each water right is allocated a maximum 
annual quantity of water that must be applied to a particular plot of land and come 
from a specific water source. Further, groundwater is a common property resource, 
meaning that without appropriate water prices individual farmers have little incentive 
to save groundwater for future use. Under prior appropriation, rights holders who 
currently only pay the cost of pumping water are unlikely to welcome higher water 
prices, thus groundwater continues to be overused in most areas.  
Water rights retirement programs like the Conservation Reserve Enhancement 
Program of Kansas are one way to restore some level of market efficiency over space 
and time for an allocative rights system. CREP pays farmers to retire their water 
rights, effectively buying out the least productive uses of water. Thus the policy 
conserves groundwater for more productive future use. The CREP policy region in 





on its own. The High Plains Aquifer has experienced considerable depletion in the 
policy region due to intensive irrigation and low groundwater recharge. Groundwater 
levels in the policy region have dropped as much as 150 feet since 1950. In addition, 
the results of the study can also help to inform future policies. The Upper Arkansas 
River CREP was one of the first water rights retirement programs and the highly 
detailed farmer-level data offered by the state of Kansas have proved immensely 
helpful in the analysis. The results of chapters two through eight provide insights that 
will be relevant to both current and future water rights retirement programs in 
groundwater management areas that use allocative water rights systems. 
I analyze water rights retirement programs in two ways. First, I assess the 
current program’s effectiveness at reducing water for those that enroll. I find that for 
every unit of authorized use that is retired, about 0.8 units of water use is saved per 
year, making CREP one of the most highly effective voluntary incentive policies. In 
this part of the analysis, I account for the possibility that farmers that enroll are 
individuals with expectations of low future water use, which could undermine the 
program’s objective. I do not find evidence that this sort of adverse selection occurs. 
Second, I evaluate the cost-effectiveness of the current program compared to other 
potential policy designs and suggest some ways that could affect the efficiency of 
similar incentive-based policies. I find that the most cost effective policies, which 
base incentives on past use and which increase rates over time are 14% more cost-
effective than the current incentive design used with CREP, which uses incentives 





In the second analysis, coauthors and I examine issues with efficient 
management of water quality. We examine how the value of stream restoration varies 
based on whether a stream is restored on private or public land. Stream restoration is 
one of the most widely used interventions to address urban stormwater runoff and 
improve water quality. Many jurisdictions such as Baltimore County and City have 
chosen to use stream restoration as a major way to meet water quality goals. Further, 
the majority of existing stream restoration projects have been built on public land, 
largely due to ease of access. However, since the majority of streams run through 
private property, if jurisdictions would like to restore streams on a larger scale, they 
will need to restore streams on private land. Policy makers will then want to assess 
whether the benefits of stream restoration on private land are adequate. 
We conducted a choice experiment in the Baltimore metro region to examine 
household willingness to pay (WTP) for stream restoration. We use its results to ask 
two main questions. First, which types of stream restoration attributes bring the 
highest value? Second, does the household WTP for restoration attributes vary by 
land ownership and proximity to a stream? In our choice experiment, we vary the 
land ownership of restoration locations and the distance from households to streams 
in hypothetical choice scenarios that include changes in several stream restoration 
attributes. Our results indicate that household WTP for improvements in stream 
appearance and pollution reduction are positive and significant on public and private 
land across all distances. We find significant heterogeneity in WTP across land 
ownership and proximity to a stream. Further, we find that in general, there is less 





difference is only sometimes significant. Because the type and location of stream 
restoration projects are selected by policy makers this heterogeneity in the WTP can 
be of particular interest when making decisions about where to restore streams. 
Both analyses aim to provide information that is useful for the efficient 
management of water resources. The first analysis highlights a current policy with 
considerable water use savings for those that enroll, then provides evidence for 
policies that could achieve similar savings in a more cost effectiveness way. One 
wonders whether CREP is only effective because it focuses on a small subset of 
farmers for which savings can be achieved relatively cheaply. However, the policy 
seems to be a step in the right direction for groundwater managers that have struggled 
to find viable ways to reduce water use from irrigators. The second analysis examines 
an important source of spatial heterogeneity in benefits from stream restoration. Its 
results could be useful for a water manager who wants to either offset the costs of 
meeting a certain nutrient or sediment reduction target, or who wants to maximize the 




















Chapter 2: Do Water Rights Retirement Programs Effectively 
Reduce Irrigation? 
In much of the world, farmers pay little or no price for water access and lack the 
option to sell their water to those who could use it more efficiently. Farmers that use 
groundwater also have limited incentive to conserve over time, as their well levels 
largely depend on surrounding farmers’ water use. This has accelerated the depletion 
of many of the world’s most productive groundwater sources, including the High 
Plains and Central Valley aquifers in the United States (Gleeson et al. 2012). Most 
economists would prefer to address water scarcity with prices or other market-based 
policies, but political opposition and physical constraints often make these difficult to 
implement. Policy makers have favored measures such as restrictions on new 
appropriations or cost-sharing incentives for efficient irrigation systems. Recently, 
some states have also offered incentive payments for farmers willing to retire their 
irrigation rights (Sophocleous 2012). Considerable attention has been given to water 
prices, water markets, and cost-share incentives.1 However, only a few existing 
studies have considered water rights retirement programs as a viable solution to 
reduce irrigation.  
In this study, I evaluate the impact of an existing water rights retirement 
program on water use and then examine ways that future water rights retirement 
schemes can be made more cost-effective in achieving water savings. I empirically 
                                                 
1 Guilfoos, Khanna, and Peterson (2016) offer a good overview of the water pricing and marketing 
literature as it pertains to groundwater. Pfeiffer and Lin (2014a) discuss the literature on cost sharing 





analyze a panel dataset of farmer water use and enrollments in the Conservation 
Reserve Enhancement Program (CREP) in the Upper Arkansas River Basin (UAR), a 
water rights retirement program implemented in Western Kansas. First, I determine 
the impact of CREP enrollment on farmer water use using fixed effects regressions. 
Because CREP is a voluntary program, farmers that retire their water rights may 
differ than those that do not. To account for this sample selection, enrolled farmers 
are matched with similar unenrolled farmers from both inside and outside of the 
policy region prior to estimating panel models of water use. A matched sample is 
created using covariate matching with calipers and is then used to estimate fixed 
effects models of water use. One model specification tests whether farmers increase 
water use in the immediate years before enrollment in order to qualify for the 
program. Second, I evaluate the cost-effectiveness of different water rights retirement 
program designs using simulations of farmer enrollment. Panel binary choice 
regressions estimate the impact of CREP incentive payments and farmer 
characteristics on program enrollment. These estimates are then used to simulate 
farmer enrollment decisions outside of the policy region (Lewis and Plantinga 2007; 
Mason and Plantinga 2013). Simulated enrollment decisions are combined with water 
use data for farmers outside the CREP policy region to determine which types of 
incentives are the most cost-effective in achieving water savings.   
 The literature on agricultural water use has highlighted the difficulty of 
finding policies that effectively save water. Some studies have focused on incentive 
payments for efficient irrigation systems (Ding and Peterson 2012; Pfeiffer and Lin 





focus on more traditional economic tools like taxes, quantity restrictions or water 
rights markets (Thompson et al. 2009; Guilfoos, Khanna, and Peterson 2016), but 
these approaches usually have limited political support or high implementation costs 
(Tsur and Dinar 1997; Guilfoos, Khanna, and Peterson 2016). In recent years, several 
theoretical studies have hypothesized about the potential effects of rights retirement 
programs (Wheeler et al. 2008; Ding and Peterson 2012; Wang, Park, and Jin 2015), 
but fewer studies have assessed their impacts empirically. One exception is Monger et 
al. (2018), who estimate the effect of the level of incentive rates on enrollment in 
CREP. However, the following is the first economic study to empirically examine the 
effect of rights retirement programs on water use. This analysis also contributes to the 
literature examining the environmental effects that can be directly attributed to 
voluntary incentive programs (Mezzatesta, Newburn, and Woodward 2013). A 
voluntary program requiring the retirement of irrigation rights could attract a subset 
of farmers who value their water rights less than others. Thus, it is important to 
examine the extent to which incentive payments actually reduce water use. Finally, 
several studies simulate land use decisions to evaluate the cost-effectiveness of 
incentive-based policies (e.g., Lewis and Plantinga 2007; Lewis et al. 2011). 
However, this is the first study to simulate farmer enrollment to assess the cost-
effectiveness of water rights retirement programs. Policy makers looking for more 
efficient ways to reduce farmer water use could gain insight from these findings.  
The analysis yields several main findings and policy implications. First, fixed 
effects models using matched samples of farmers reveal that, for each unit of 





year. This means that CREP does not attract low water use farmers and actually 
attracts farmers with above average annual water use. The high water savings 
attributable to CREP contrast with the low savings associated with previous policies 
aimed at reducing irrigation. These large water use reductions are partially 
attributable to the program’s eligibility requirements, which only allow intensely 
irrigated land to be enrolled. However, water savings attributable to CREP far exceed 
those that would be expected based on eligibility requirements alone. This suggests 
that there is not a strong relationship between the value of water rights and levels of 
water use. Second, the analysis does not find evidence that farmers increase water use 
after program announcement in an attempt to qualify for the program. Instead, 
farmers actually ramp down their water use as they prepare to retire their rights. Then 
a regression of CREP enrollment decisions finds that factors that increase the 
probability of enrollment include: higher incentive payments; lower soil productivity; 
higher erodibility of soil; and lower amounts of remaining water in the underlying 
aquifer. Results from the enrollment regression are applied in simulations of 
alternative retirement programs to assess their cost-effectiveness for water use 
reduction. Policy simulations suggest that incentive rates based on levels of prior 
water use are more cost-effective in achieving water savings than rates based on 
retired acreage. Lastly, retirement policies can be made more cost-effective by 
increasing incentive rates over time. Rollouts of incentive rates are more cost-
effective because they are able to capture unobserved differences in the willingness to 





simulated in this study are those that both base incentive rates on prior water use and 
that increase offered rates over time. 
Chapters 3 through 8 analyze the effectiveness of CREP at reducing water 
use. Chapter 3 provides a more in-depth analysis of the relevant literature. This is 
followed by chapter 4, which provides policy background about water rights in 
Kansas and the Upper Arkansas River CREP program. After that, the data used in the 
analysis are clarified in chapter 5 and then the econometric strategies used in the 
analysis are outlined in chapter 6. The fixed effects model is first described, then the 
approach for evaluating cost-effectiveness of programs is outlined. Finally, in chapter 
7 the results of the regression analysis and simulation are discussed and conclusions 

























Chapter 3: Water Management, Additionality and Cost-
Effectiveness 
Many different approaches for managing groundwater have been examined in the 
literature. Water prices have received considerable attention. Shah, Zilberman and 
Chakravorty (1993) explore the use of prices for groundwater pumping. They show 
that the optimal level of groundwater pumping occurs when the marginal benefit of 
extraction equals the marginal pumping cost plus the opportunity cost of lost future 
water supplies. However, because groundwater is a common property resource, users 
are unlikely to account for the opportunity cost when making their use decisions. 
Thus a water price should be set at the opportunity cost of water supplies. However, 
such a price would be both difficult and costly to implement due to high costs of 
monitoring and enforcement. As an alternative, the authors suggest using a price 
based on irrigation system used and crop choice as a second best policy solution 
(Shah, Zilberman and Chakravorty 1993). In addition to being difficult to monitor, 
groundwater prices are likely to be met with political resistance, particularly when the 
benefits of conservation are concentrated in small areas (Guilfoos, Khanna, and 
Peterson 2016).  
Water markets are sometimes used as an alternative to prices, although usually 
to manage surface water. Some relatively successful surface water markets have been 
set up in Australia and South Africa. Nieuwoudt, Armitage and Backeberg (2001) 
find that for water markets in South Africa, high water scarcity, relatively low 
transaction costs, and a heterogeneous group of users leads to more trades. However, 





appropriation. South Africa transferred rights from private to public ownership and 
Australia decoupled rights from land before marketing water (Schoengold and 
Zilberman 2007). Considerably less attention has been given to markets for 
groundwater (Thompson et al. 2009). Thompson et al. (2009) find that a cap and trade 
system for managing groundwater leads to a more efficient allocation of water use 
over space, but does not necessarily reduce overall water use. Guilfoos, Khanna, and 
Peterson (2016) find that locally managed groundwater markets that consider future 
consequences of extraction are needed to allocate water use most efficiently over the 
life of an aquifer.  
Voluntary incentive programs are another way to encourage water 
conservation. Several studies have examined the impacts of cost-share programs for 
efficient irrigation systems, such as the Environmental Quality Incentives Program 
(Ding and Peterson 2012; Pfeiffer and Lin 2014a). Pfeiffer and Lin (2014a) find that 
in some cases, increases in irrigation efficiency may actually lead to increases in 
water use due to increased profitability of applied irrigation water. However, they 
also find that when farmers adopt irrigation systems that improve irrigation efficiency 
more substantially, there is a significant drop in use. Pfeiffer (2009) looks at the effect 
of acres enrolled in the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) on water use at the 
county level. She finds that the effect is small, probably because the CRP does not 
explicitly target water use reduction and farmers that enroll are unlikely to enroll 
irrigated cropland.  
A small literature looks at the effects of water rights retirement programs in 





buyout programs (e.g., Wheeler et al. 2008; Ding and Peterson 2012; Wang, Park, 
and Jin 2015). Wheeler et al. (2008) find that longer term buyouts have a larger effect 
on water savings than short term buyouts, but are less cost-effective. Ding and 
Peterson (2012) use an optimization model to examine the cost-effectiveness of water 
rights retirement programs in Kansas. They find that lower crop prices and 
groundwater levels, both of which lower the value of water, are highly influential for 
decisions about whether or not to enroll in such programs. Even fewer empirical 
studies have examined water rights retirement programs. Monger et al. (2018) use a 
binary choice model to determine which factors influence enrollment in CREP in the 
Republican River Basin of Colorado. They find that the level of incentive payments, 
the water levels of a well, closeness to streams and soil quality all significantly 
impact enrollment. However, they do not investigate the extent to which CREP 
impacts consumptive water use, or evaluate the program’s cost-effectiveness. As of 
yet, no one has empirically examined the water use effects and cost-effectiveness of 
water rights retirement programs. 
This analysis also contributes more broadly to the literature analyzing the 
environmental impacts and cost-effectiveness of incentive-based conservation 
policies. The extent to which desired environmental outcomes are directly attributable 
to a conservation program is sometimes called additionality in the literature. Different 
designs for voluntary incentive programs can lead to different amounts of 
additionality (Lichtenberg 2014). Additionality of a program is particularly relevant 
when the incentivized conservation approach can benefit farmers even without 





farmers for doing something they would do anyway. Further, if a conservation 
program only attracts a subset of farmers, that subset may be among those for whom 
the conservation program changes their behavior the least. Various incentive-based 
conservation policies exist and their levels of additionality vary considerably. For 
example, using propensity score matching, Mezzatesta, Newburn, and Woodward 
(2013) find that cost-share incentives for different agricultural BMPs have vastly 
different levels of additionality. Lichtenberg (2014) explains why disparities in 
additionality may occur, comparing the design of different conservation programs. 
Programs with more stringent eligibility requirements, like EQIP, tend to result in 
more additionality than conservation programs with looser requirements such as the 
CRP (Lichtenberg et al. 2011). Further, the potential for slippage, or increases in 
productive activity in areas that are not conserved as a result of incentive payments, 
as has occurred with the CRP, can further reduce additionality (Roberts and 
Lubowski 2007; Lubowski, Plantinga and Stavens 2008). The results of this study 
suggest that, among those studied, CREP is one of the most highly additional 
incentive-based conservation policies. One reason for this may be its strict eligibility 
requirements, the details of which are discussed in the next chapter. However, the 
high additionality attributable to CREP far exceeds those expected from its eligibility 
requirements alone. This result implies that more valuable water rights are not 
necessarily used for more intensive irrigation. 
Another important strain of literature focuses on mechanisms for improving 
the cost-effectiveness of conservation programs. Ideally, managers could rank 





divided by the additional environmental benefits attributable to their enrollment. 
Policy mechanisms may be designed to approach this ideal policy in the face of 
asymmetric information between farmers and managers, which results from farmers 
knowing the value of their water rights and their future activities better than 
managers. Two of the main mechanisms analyzed in the literature to address 
asymmetric information include optimal contracts and auctions (Latacz-Lohmann and 
Schilizzi 2005). For example, Mason and Plantinga (2013) find that optimal contracts 
could increase forest cover at only 40% of the costs of using uniform incentive rates. 
For conservation, auctions are more commonly used in practice and have been 
studied in detail. Auctions can be much more cost effective than fixed prices. 
Discriminant auctions, which pay winning bidders their exact bid amounts, can 
achieve higher water savings for a given budget if bid shading is minimal. 
Alternatively, uniform priced auctions can be beneficial if the distribution of 
underlying compliance costs is unknown and the manager would like to reveal this 
distribution to set an appropriate cost (Latacz-Lohmann and Schilizzi 2005). 
However, auction mechanisms often do not perform as intended. The CRP 
uses an auction mechanism to make payments to farmers that conserve land and has 
historically made payments to all farmers with bids below an unrevealed bid cap. 
Landowners tend to learn the level at which bids are capped over time, eroding any 
cost savings from the auction mechanism (Reichelderfer and Boggess 1998). 
However, some other more targeted auction programs such as BushTender in 
Australia found large gains in cost-effectiveness (Latacz-Lohmann and Schilizzi 





improving the cost-effectiveness of incentive-based programs. I find that these 
mechanisms lead to substantial improvements in cost-effectiveness over fixed 
incentive policies. They provide an alternative to auctions for improving the cost-
effectiveness of conservation programs, particularly when auctions create significant 
barriers to program participation. In particular, I find that policies based on past water 
use improve cost-effectiveness considerably, tying program costs more to the policy 
objective of water savings. I also find that policies that increase rates over time 
improve cost-effectiveness because they get farmers with the lowest value for water 
to enroll earliest by starting with a low incentive. They can then gradually get farmers 







Chapter 4: Water in Kansas and the Conservation Reserve 
Enhancement Program 
The High Plains is a region of the United States known for intensely irrigated 
agriculture. The underlying High Plains Aquifer system (See Figure 4.1) is the 
semiarid region’s primary source of water. An aquifer is an underground permeable 
rock formation that allows for storage of water, where its depth is generally 
determined by the presence of impermeable bedrock. For the region of Kansas 
overlying the High Plains Aquifer, groundwater accounts for approximately 99% of 
total reported water use, 95% of which is used for irrigated agriculture (Schloss, 
Buddemeier, and Wilson 2000). Due to intensive use over many years, the saturated 
thickness of the aquifer, or the height of water from its bedrock, has depleted 
substantially. As a result, in many areas across the region, policy makers have been 
searching for ways to reduce aquifer depletion while retaining the health of the local 
agricultural-based economy.  
The primary means for allocating water in Kansas, as in most of the Western 
United States, is through the prior appropriation doctrine. In times of shortage priority 
is assigned to those rights that were claimed the earliest and all water rights must be 
used for an approved beneficial use. In Kansas, following the Water Appropriations 
Act of 1945, each water right is assigned a maximum annual quantity and rate of 
water use associated with particular places of use and points of diversion (Peck et al. 
1998). Due to initial declines in levels of the High Plains Aquifer in Western Kansas, 
efforts to restrict new water appropriations started in the late 1970s. However, by that 





being pumped from the aquifer each year is significantly higher than the rate of 
recharge. Declines have been highest in the portion of the aquifer in Western Kansas, 
which has low annual rainfall and where aquifer recharge is negligible (Sophocleous 
2012). Figure 4.1 shows the estimated usable lifetime of the High Plains Aquifer 
underlying Kansas, calculated by the Kansas Geological Survey. In many areas in 
Western Kansas that rely on intensive irrigated agriculture, the aquifer is expected to 
have less than 25 years of water left. 
 
Figure 4.1: Estimated usable lifetime of High Plain Aquifer in Kansas 






The reality of water rights in Kansas limits the policy choices available for 
slowing aquifer depletion. Most water governance of the aquifer is controlled by the 
five Groundwater Management Districts (GMD), which represent the management 
needs of five distinct aquifer regions. GMDs have mainly implemented policies 
limiting new appropriations. This includes well spacing regulations and safe yield 
policies that reject new appropriations in areas that are already over-appropriated. 
However, policies that restrict new appropriations have no effect on the water use of 
existing appropriators. Restrictions on use are hard to implement because water rights 
holders are protected from uncompensated takings by the government, so that rights 
are held in perpetuity as long as they are used. Alternatives to quantity restrictions, 
such as water banks and cost-share incentives for more efficient irrigation systems 
have been unsuccessful at reducing water use. Recently, Kansas has been one of 
several agricultural states to experiment with water rights retirement programs. This 
includes the Water Rights Transition Assistance Program (WTAP) and the Upper 
Arkansas River Conservation Reserve Enhancement Program (CREP), the latter of 
which this study examines in detail. WTAP pays incentives for irrigators to retire 
their water rights in critically depleted areas and is an interesting opportunity for 
future research (Sophocleous 2012). 
Administered by the Farm Service Agency (FSA) of the United States 
Department of Agriculture (USDA), CREP is a part of the Conservation Reserve 
Program (CRP), which funds private land conservation. Nationwide, CREP addresses 
state and national environmental issues related to agricultural land use and offers 





vegetation. Voluntary participants receive annual rental payments from the FSA, in 
addition to other incentives often paid by the participating state (United States 
Department of Agriculture [USDA] 2007). The Kansas legislature initially approved 
funding for the Upper Arkansas River (UAR) CREP program in 2007. The Kansas 
Water Office (KWO), FSA and Natural Resources Conservation Service (NRCS) of 
the USDA worked together to implement the program in late 2007 (Kansas 
Department of Agriculture 2017). The UAR CREP offers annual rental payments and 
cost-sharing for conservation practices from the USDA, as well as a one-time signing 
bonus from the KWO. In exchange, enrolled farmers must adopt an approved 
conservation practice, cease irrigation and permanently retire their water rights. An 
eligible conservation practice must be put in place for the duration of the contract, 
which is 14 to 15 years long. After that the farmer may return to dryland agriculture. 
The program's stated goals are to protect water quality and to slow depletion of the 
aquifer in the policy region. 
The UAR CREP is offered in parts of ten counties in Southwestern and South 
Central Kansas (see figure 4.2). Initially, the program was capped at 20,000 acres, but 
in 2011 was expanded to allow up to 28,950 enrolled acres. The cap has not yet been 
reached. There are county limits on acreage enrolled as well, which were recently 
reached in Gray and Kearny counties. However, the Kansas legislature allowed 
expansion of the county caps in 2017 and enrollments from these counties have 
continued. The program is targeted towards high water use irrigators on highly 
erodible soils. Eligibility for the program is based on historical water use for the 





of irrigation water per acre must have been used in four of six specified years and at 
least 50% of the maximum annual quantity authorized with the retired right must 
have been used in any three of the past five years (USDA 2007). Annual enrollment 
payments from the FSA were initially set at $100-125 per acre of irrigated land 
retired, were increased to $115-140 per acre in 2011 and again to $153-193 in 2015 
(USDA 2007). These payments vary based on HUC 8-digit watershed and type of 
irrigation system. One-time payments from the state of Kansas were initially set at 
$62 per acre or $35 per acre depending on a designation of soil tier 1 or 2 
respectively. Tiers are based on soil erodibility. In 2016, these rates were increased to 
$97 and $55 per acre for tier 1 and 2, respectively. As of 2018, a total of 22,479 acres 
of irrigated farmland from 145 water rights have been retired (USDA, 2007). As can 
be seen in table 4.1, spikes in enrollment in the program are highly associated with 
rate increases. Both FSA rate hikes occurred late in the year. Consequently, many 
farmers did not enroll until the year after, especially after the rate hike in 2011. This 































Table 4.1: Upper Arkansas River CREP enrollment statistics 
Year 







2008 63 8,794 16,477 
2009 10 1,768 3,213 
2010 6 1,187 2,023 
2011 5 680 1,311 
2012 22 4,267 7,477 
2013 4 320 1,495 
2014 0 0 0 
2015 14 1,772 2,918 
2016 10 1,194 2,307 
2017 4 407 600 
2018 7 2,090 2,338 
Total 145 22,479 40,158 
Note: Data was provided by Steve Frost. As a 
reference, a total of 749,312.9 acres were authorized 





Chapter 5: Data for Analysis of CREP 
In 1988, Kansas required reporting of water use for all non-domestic wells 
(Sophocleous 2012). Consequently, the Kansas Department of Agriculture and the 
Kansas Geological Survey provide a highly detailed water rights database, called the 
Water Information Management Analysis System (WIMAS). Most data provided by 
WIMAS is recorded at the unique water right, well, or place of use level, or at some 
unique combination of the three. Table 5.1 provides the unit of observation for each 
of the variables used in the analysis. The water use data, reported each year in total 
acre-feet used, is most complete starting in 1996 and is available until 2016. Thus, the 
water use analysis is conducted for those years. If a unique well is associated with 
multiple water rights, water use can be recorded one of two ways. It can be recorded 
all in one report which aggregates water use across all rights, or in separate reports 
that record the water use of each unique water right-well combination (Wilson et al. 
2005). WIMAS also identifies the total and net acres and AF authorized for a 
particular water right. If multiple water rights overlap for a place of use, net acreage 
or AF authorized are positive for the most senior right. For most water use reports, 
WIMAS also provides information about which crop types were planted each year, 
including single crops and various crop combinations, as well as the irrigation system 
used each year. Finally, for most wells, data is provided on depth to groundwater, 
measured as the distance in feet from ground-level to the top of the aquifer. 
Information about which water rights have enrolled in CREP and their 
associated right dismissal dates is provided by the Kansas Department of Agriculture. 





2018, the date on which each water right file was dismissed and how many acre-feet 
of authorized use were associated with the retired right. The Kansas Department of 
Agriculture have also provided a shapefile showing the CREP policy region. The 
shapefile is used to identify which water rights are eligible for CREP and what soil 
tier each right is associated with. Rental rates from the FSA and one-time payments 
from the state of Kansas are identified using brochures marketing the program to 
farmers.  
Table 5.1: Description and Sources of Data 
Variable Unit of Observation Source 
WR One to Many WRs per Well WIMAS 
Well One to Many Wells per WR WIMAS 
POU (QQ section) One to Many POUs per WR WIMAS 
Water Use Well or WR/Well combination WIMAS 
Crop Type Well or WR/Well combination WIMAS 
Irrigation System Well or WR/Well combination WIMAS 
Depth to Groundwater Well WIMAS 
Total and Net AF Authorized WR or WR/Well combination WIMAS 
Total and Net Acres Authorized WR WIMAS 
GMD WR WIMAS 
Right Dismissal Dates WR DOA 
Rental Rates HUC8 DOA 
Geospatial Data Format Source 
POU (QQ Section) Shapefile BLM 
CREP region Shapefile DOA 
Soil Tier Shapefile DOA 
Soil Data Raster SSURGO 
Saturated Thickness Raster NHD 
Abbreviations   
WIMAS Water Information Management Analysis System 
DOA Kansas Department of Agriculture 
WR Water Right 
POU Place of Use 
QQ Quarter-Quarter Section (40 acres) 
GMD Groundwater Management District 
BLM Bureau of Land Management 
SSURGO Soil Survey Geographic Database from the US Department of Agriculture 





Data is also compiled from various other sources. Spatial soil data is available 
in raster format from the Soil Survey Geographic Database (SSURGO) from the 
USDA. Included in the analysis are the non-irrigated capability class (NICC), 
available water storage (0-150 cm), land slope (measured in degrees), national 
commodity crop productivity index (NCCPI), and the wind erosion index (WEI). 
Wind erodibility is an important determinant in Kansas’ process for categorizing soil 
tiers. Data for saturated thickness in 2009 comes from the United States Geological 
Survey (USGS) National Hydrography dataset and a boundary file identifying HUC 
8-digit watersheds is from the KWO. Rental rates offered by the FSA to each water 
right are determined by which HUC 8-digit watershed it is located in, the particular 
year of the observation, and which irrigation system it had at the beginning of the 
program. Rates from the state of Kansas are determined by soil tier and the year of 
the observation.  
Measuring the effect of enrollment in CREP on water use requires a unit of 
observation that identifies the total water use associated with a particular plot of land. 
This unit of observation must also have an identifiable amount of acreage and 
quantity of authorized water use retired under CREP in any given year. Because the 
relationships between water rights, wells and places of use can be complex, I create a 
unit of observation that I call water usage units to analyze the effects of CREP on 
water use. Usage units often correspond with individual water rights, but in many 
cases are composed of a combination of multiple rights, wells and places of use. I 
describe them in more detail in the next paragraph. Enrollment decisions, on the other 





Consequently, I generate control variables separately for both the usage unit and 
water right levels. 
Water usage units are needed because enrollments in CREP and water use are 
recorded at different units of observations. Farmers enroll individual water rights in 
CREP, but record their water use at the well level. This poses a problem because 
water use cannot always be identified at the unique water right level and the amount 
of acreage or authorized use enrolled in CREP cannot always be identified at the well 
level. Because water use reports sometimes aggregate use for individual wells 
attached to several water rights, water use cannot always be identified for a water 
right. Further, authorized acreage or authorized use is associated with water rights and 
not with wells. If multiple wells are associated with a unique water right, an amount 
of acreage or authorized use enrolled in CREP cannot be assigned to an individual 
well. Finally, it is desirable to obtain the total water use for entire plots of land, which 
are identified by places of use. Even if water use can be identified for a water right, 
this may not reflect total water use for a plot of land if multiple water rights are 
associated with it. Consequently, I create water usage units, which can be defined as 
the smallest unit of non-overlapping combinations of water rights, points of diversion 
and places of use.  
Figure 5.1 provides an example that helps clarify how water usage units are 
created. In the figure, wells 1 and 2 are combined into a single water usage unit. The 
two wells have overlapping places of use and are both associated with water right 1. 
Thus, the annual water use for water usage unit 1 is defined as the sum of water use 





and thus is a separate water usage unit. However, suppose well 2 supplies place of use 
3 in addition to place of use 2. In this case all three wells are combined into one water 
usage unit, even though there would still be no direct overlap between wells 1 and 3. 
By creating water usage units, the total water used for a particular defined plot of land 
can be identified. Further, any retired land is completely included in a particular 
usage unit. This allows for an accurate measurement of how the retirement of a 
portion of a water usage unit affects water use. Annual water use (both total and per 
acre), net acres authorized, total retired acre-feet and acreage through CREP are all 
calculated at the water usage unit level. 
In contrast to water use decisions, enrollment decisions in CREP are best 
analyzed at the water right level. Thus, variables are constructed at the usage unit and 
water right levels to use in the water use and enrollment regression analyses, 
respectively. Because soil and saturated thickness data is distributed continuously in 
raster format, it is used to create weighted averages at the water right and water usage 
unit levels. Places of use for water rights and their associated authorized acreage are 
recorded at the quarter-quarter section level of the public land system survey (PLSS) 
from the Bureau of Land Management. Because of this, soil and saturated thickness 
data is obtained for the centroid of each quarter-quarter section. I then create weights 
based on the proportion of each water unit or water right taken up by each quarter-
quarter section.2 I then average soil characteristics accordingly to get soil and 
saturated thickness data at the water unit and right levels. Because the NICC is a 
                                                 
2 Only the PLSS section grid is publicly available. To create a shapefile of quarter-quarter sections, I 
divide the PLSS section grid into sixteenths. Then using the centroids of each quarter-quarter section, I 





categorical variable, I use the mode for a particular water unit or right rather than 
weighted averages. Finally, for well depths, I use the average depth to water for the 
most recent measurements across all wells associated with each usage unit or right. 
 
Figure 5.1: Relationship between water rights, places of use, wells and water 
usage units 
Note: The figure shows an example of relationships between water rights, places of use and well to 
illustrate the need for water usage units. Water use is recorded for each well, either aggregated across 
all associated water rights, or for each individual water right. Because water use is sometimes 
aggregated, you cannot know water use for each water right uniquely. In general, each well can be 
associated with several places of use and water rights. Water rights can each have places of use and 
wells that overlap. Water usage units are defined as mutually exclusive groups of well-water right-
place of use combinations such that there is no overlap in any of the three elements. 
 
Some variables are only included in the enrollment analysis. This includes 
crops grown and irrigation system used. Because usage units can consist of many 
water rights and wells, there is not an intuitive way to associate one particular type of 
crop or irrigation system to usage units generally. To determine the crop most 





the water right level for each year. Then, the mode across all pre-policy years is used 
to determine which crop was grown most often. Irrigation systems for a water right 
are specified as the most recent irrigation system used before the program. Irrigation 
systems can be a flood, center pivot or Low Energy Precision Application (LEPA) 
center pivot system, where each is assigned a dummy variable and flood is the default 
category. 
Tables 5.2 and 5.3 provide sample statistics for each of the variables generated 
for the analysis, at the usage unit and water right levels, respectively. Means and 
standard deviations for each variable are shown for observations either inside or 
outside the CREP region (see figure 4.2). Note that crop choice and irrigation system 
are identifiable at the water right level, but not easily aggregated to the usage unit 
level. However, neither of these factors have a significant impact on enrollment, as 
we will see. In the CREP region, there are 3,187 senior water rights with positive net 
authorized acreage, associated with 2,448 unique water usage units. Averages of most 
variables are comparable between usage units and water rights. The notable exception 
is net acres authorized. This reflects the fact that usage units may be made up of 
multiple water rights with positive net authorized acreage. Groundwater users in the 
CREP region are representative of other groundwater users in the state for some 
variables. Saturated thickness, depth to groundwater, and general soil quality 
(measured as NCCPI) are similar inside and outside the CREP policy region. 
However, the region is made up of higher sloped land and more erodible soils, which 





Table 5.2: Summary Statistics of Water Rights 
 Non-CREP region rights CREP region rights 
 Mean SD Mean SD 
Avg Water Use per Acre (of associated unit) 0.690 0.829 0.893 0.497 
Wind Erosion Index 62.12 37.23 97.52 55.00 
Available Water Storage (mm) 230.2 99.56 211.5 66.41 
NCCPI 0.313 0.152 0.287 0.117 
Slope Gradient 1.571 1.800 3.574 4.413 
NICC 2.504 0.873 3.381 1.668 
Missing NICC 0.209 0.406 0.101 0.301 
Saturated Thickness (ft) 116.0 86.64 129.7 81.75 
Missing Sat Thickness 0.186 0.390 0.0228 0.149 
Corn Grower 0.535 0.342 0.384 0.331 
Alfalfa Grower 0.0752 0.203 0.245 0.333 
Wheat Grower 0.164 0.260 0.170 0.257 
Missing Crop Data 0.149 0.356 0.141 0.348 
Flood 0.162 0.369 0.132 0.338 
Center Pivot 0.176 0.381 0.165 0.372 
Center Pivot - LEPA 0.615 0.487 0.682 0.466 
Missing Irrigation System 0.178 0.382 0.177 0.381 
Depth to Water (ft) 97.45 107.8 102.5 89.08 
Missing Depth 0.460 0.498 0.476 0.500 
Net Acres Authorized 220.6 221.0 235.8 222.5 
Number of Water Rights 17,048  3,187  




Table 5.3: Summary Statistics at Usage Unit Level 
 Non-CREP region units CREP region units 
 Mean SD Mean SD 
Avg Water Use per Acre 0.721 0.876 0.931 0.517 
Wind Erosion Index 63.02 37.24 95.07 53.71 
Available Water Storage (mm) 232.3 97.03 214.4 67.10 
NCCPI 0.348 0.147 0.317 0.122 
Slope Gradient 1.615 1.785 3.380 4.253 
NICC 2.492 0.864 3.257 1.625 
Missing NICC 0.190 0.393 0.0895 0.285 
Saturated Thickness (ft) 114.6 83.63 126.6 81.41 
Missing Sat Thickness 0.173 0.378 0.0155 0.124 
Depth to Water (ft) 98.99 108.2 103.9 88.80 
Missing Depth 0.393 0.489 0.382 0.486 
Net Acres Authorized 265.7 296.6 306.1 359.2 
Number of Water Units 14,238  2,448  
Note: The table includes data from 2008 for all water units with positive net authorized acreage 





Chapter 6:  Methods Used in CREP Analysis 
6.1. Effects of CREP on Water Use 
The first part of the analysis determines the water use savings that can be directly 
attributed to the UAR CREP. Using a panel of annual water use of water usage units, 
equation 6.1 describes the first specification used to estimate the policy impact. In 
equation 6.1, wit is the water use per acre of water usage unit i in year t. The variable 
Rit designates the total acre-feet per acre or the proportion of total acreage retired for 
water unit i in a particular year. Additionally, μi is a usage unit-level fixed effect, λt 
are year fixed effects, γit are GMD-year fixed effects, and eit is a random component. 
Water use does not cease entirely when rights are first enrolled in CREP. Small levels 
of irrigation are allowed for the first two years after enrollment in order to establish 
conservation crops. The variable Eit measures the acre-feet per acre or proportion of 
total acreage of a water unit that is enrolled in CREP but has not yet been required to 
cease irrigation completely. Once irrigation must be stopped entirely, Rit is positive 
and Eit equals zero. 
(6.1)    𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝛼𝛼𝐸𝐸 + 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝛼𝛼𝑅𝑅 +  𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 + 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖 +  𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
Unit-level fixed effects control for any time-invariant influences on water use. 
Further, year fixed effects and GMD-year fixed effects control for overall and region-
specific time-varying influences on water use. However, an important identifying 
assumption must be made for the specification in equation 6.1 to consistently estimate 
the marginal impact of CREP on water use. The year and GMD-year fixed effects 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖 
and 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 must represent the counterfactual trends in water use for usage units that 





that enroll in CREP (now called enrolled units) have similar water use trends to those 
units that don’t enroll (unenrolled units). This assumption is likely to fail if equation 
6.1 is estimated using a sample that includes all water usage units in the CREP 
region. For example, suppose enrolled units have worse soil quality on average than 
unenrolled units. Farms with different soil quality may respond to annual fluctuations 
in rainfall or changes in crop prices differently, or may have different long term 
trends in water use in general. Parallel trends of water use for enrolled and unenrolled 
units in pre-policy years may provide a useful indicator of whether a simple fixed 
effects model is adequate. However, pre-policy parallel trends may not perfectly 
predict differences in expected water use between enrolled and unenrolled units in the 
policy period. For example, enrolled farmers who anticipate decreasing water use a 
few years in the future may use a high amount of water until then. 
If unenrolled units do not serve as a viable counterfactual, pre-regression 
matching can be useful to balance the sample before running a fixed effects 
regression. Matching samples before using panel regression techniques has become 
increasingly common in the environmental and resource economics literature (Jones 
and Lewis 2015). Ferraro and Miranda (2017) compare the performance of panel 
models for several non-experimental panel data designs with results from a 
randomized control trial of a household water conservation intervention. They find 
that fixed effects models combined with pre-regression matching designs perform 
considerably better than fixed effects without matching. They claim that matching 





Such assumptions include common response to shocks and homogenous treatment 
effects. 
 Due to the likely presence of sample selection, a matched sample is created 
prior to estimating the regression specified in equation 6.1. A matched control sample 
is created by pairing each enrolled unit with a comparable unenrolled unit either 
inside or outside the UAR CREP region. The matched sample is created using one-to-
one covariate matching without replacement, with 1 standard deviation calipers for all 
unit-level covariates. Ferraro and Miranda (2017) find that covariate matching using 
calipers leads to estimates that very closely approximate their experimental results 
and that outperform other matching approaches. Covariate balance and parallel trends 
are then examined. Finally, fixed effects regressions are estimated using the matched 
sample. As a robustness check, a matched sample is also generated using propensity 
scores. A probit regression is run with all usage units in the CREP region to 
determine the propensity of being an enrolled unit. Propensity scores are then 
assigned to all unenrolled units both inside and outside the CREP region and enrolled 
units are matched to unenrolled units with the closest propensity scores. This second 
matched sample is then used to estimate fixed effects regressions as well. Caliper 
matching is preferred due to better covariate balance and closer pre-policy trends, but 
results are very similar for both approaches. 
Even with a matched sample, equation 6.1 may fail to estimate the policy 
effect if water users change their behavior after the program is initiated. Once the 
program is announced, some farmers who use little water may want to retire their 





farmers will not be eligible at the time of program announcement. Thus, they may 
increase their water use for the few years after program announcement so that they 
satisfy its eligibility requirements. If this phenomenon is common, it could make the 
policy effect appear artificially large. Equation 6.2 tests for this concern. The variable 
𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 indicates for enrolled units how much they will eventually enroll, once the 
program is announced in 2007. For each enrolled unit, the variable is positive starting 
in 2007 and zero once the unit actually enrolls acreage in CREP.  
(6.2)    𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝛼𝛼𝐴𝐴 + 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝛼𝛼𝐸𝐸 + 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝛼𝛼𝑅𝑅 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 +  𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖 +  𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
Because enrollments in CREP occur over time, dynamic sample selection may 
also be a concern. The specification in equation 6.3 provides a simple approach that 
accounts for the possibility of dynamic sample selection. If usage units that enroll 
acreage in later years have different water use trends than those that enroll land early, 
the estimated marginal effects of CREP could be biased. As seen in table 4.1, 
enrollments in the program highly corresponded with increases in program rental 
rates. In the study period, only the price increase in 2012 has had adequate time to 
observe full right retirements. Thus, I split enrolled units into early and late 
enrollments, depending on whether they enrolled acreage before or after 2012. 
Because each enrolled unit is matched with an unenrolled unit, I classify all 
unenrolled units based on the classification of its enrolled counterpart. In equation 
6.3, I include interactions between year dummies or GMD-year dummies and a 
dummy for being a late enrollment 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖. Classifying enrollments based on time of 
enrollment allows for differential responses to shocks between the two groups. 





6.2. Targeting for Water Use 
Voluntary incentive schemes often come up short in achieving their intended policy 
goals due to unintended behavior of recipients. Consequently, measuring the water 
use reduction attributable to CREP is a crucial part of evaluating its performance. 
However, even if CREP leads to significant water savings for those that enroll, it may 
cost federal and state agencies more than is necessary. This section outlines the 
conceptual problem faced by a government agency seeking a cost-effective water 
rights retirement program. 
The approach used to evaluate the cost-effectiveness of retirement policies is 
motivated with a brief conceptual model. Suppose a water rights retirement program 
similar to CREP offers per-acre incentives to farmers willing to retire their water 
rights. Assume for now that the incentive rates offered do not increase over time. We 
will consider the implications of rate increases below. Each farmer has a value 𝜋𝜋𝑗𝑗  per 
acre for his water right 𝑗𝑗 and will have an annual per-acre water use 𝑤𝑤𝑗𝑗 if he retains 
his water right.3 If a farmer retires his water right, his annual water use then equals 
zero. Further, assume that farmers have static expectations of future returns, meaning 
that they expect the value of their water rights to remain constant over time.4 Thus 
once a farmer stands to receive at least 𝜋𝜋𝑗𝑗 in total incentive payments per acre, he will 
retire his water right and there will be a savings of 𝑤𝑤𝑗𝑗 for each acre that farmer retires.  
                                                 
3 In CREP, the farmer can return to dryland agriculture after 15 years. For CREP, the value of a water 
right is simply the difference in profits received between retaining and retiring the right.  
4 Relaxing this assumption could complicate the model considerably (Plantinga and Lewis 2014). It is 





Now consider the manager’s problem in equation 6.4, given the above 
decision rule for farmers. Suppose the manager of the retirement program has perfect 
information, such that he can perfectly predict water right values and water use for 
each farmer. He will maximize water savings, equal to the sum of water savings from 
all enrolled farmers, subject to a budget constraint 𝐶𝐶. Water savings for a particular 
farmer’s water right is positive if the manager offers more than the value of the 
farmer’s water right. Thus the indicator function in the equation below will equal one 
if the manager makes such an offer. With perfect knowledge, the manager will pay no 
more than is necessary, so that incentives paid to a particular water right per acre 
retired are equal to the value of the water right per acre 𝜋𝜋𝑗𝑗. Given that a water right is 
enrolled, the water savings attributable to a given farmer equals his per-acre water use 
𝑤𝑤𝑗𝑗 times the amount of acres associated with his water right, 𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗. Total costs of the 
program equal the total incentives paid per acre 𝜃𝜃𝑗𝑗  for right 𝑗𝑗 times the acres 
associated with that right.  




𝑤𝑤𝑗𝑗𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗  𝟙𝟙(θj > πj)  𝑠𝑠. 𝑡𝑡.  ∑
𝑗𝑗
𝜃𝜃𝑗𝑗𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 ≤ 𝐶𝐶  
The left panel of figure 6.1 helps to illustrate the manager’s targeting problem. 
Farmers are distributed along two dimensions, their future annual water use and their 
future profits. A manager with perfect foresight would want to first target individuals 
with low 𝜋𝜋𝑗𝑗/𝑤𝑤𝑗𝑗. As the amount of total water savings increases, the manager will 
need to pay farmers with a higher ratio of profits to water savings. In other words, the 
marginal cost of water savings will increase as the water goal increases. A marginal 
cost of water savings function 𝑐𝑐(𝑊𝑊) can be derived by ordering all farmers based on 





function. The manager can simply pay incentives to individuals starting with those 
with the lowest costs of water savings, until the budget constraint is met. In the figure 
𝑊𝑊∗ represents the amount of water savings when the budget constraint is reached. 
The total cost with perfect targeting is then the area under the supply curve and the 





. This is the total cost divided by 
the total water savings of the program. 
Of course, such an ideal policy where the manager has perfect foresight is not 
possible. The manager cannot perfectly predict the future water use and value 
associated with each water right. However, the manager can use various techniques to 
approach the perfect policy. Consider two targeting elements of the existing CREP 
policy. The first is its eligibility requirements and the second is to increase incentive 
rates over time. CREP only pays incentives for farmers with past water use above its 
eligibility requirements. Assume for now that past water use is a good proxy for a 
farmer’s future water use if he retains his water right. As before, a farmer will enroll 
his water right in CREP if his water right is less valuable than the incentive rate paid 
to him. The shaded region in the left panel of figure 6.1 shows the farmers that will 
enroll in CREP for a given incentive rate 𝜃𝜃𝑗𝑗  and eligibility requirement (simplified 
here). By only allowing farmers with past water use above a certain level, CREP 
avoids paying high costs for low water savings. Second, by increasing rates over time, 
CREP is able to target progressively more valuable water rights. When the horizontal 
line in the left panel of figure 6.1 increases over time, farmers with higher opportunity 
costs then enroll in the program. By rolling out the policy in this way, a policy can 






Figure 6.1: Distribution of profits and water use and optimal targeting 
Note: The left panel of the figure shows which water rights will enroll in a program similar to CREP, 
given some distribution of water right values 𝜋𝜋𝑗𝑗 and water use 𝑤𝑤𝑗𝑗 . If a water manager could observe 
each value and use associated with each water right, he could rank them and create the water savings 
supply curve on the right panel. He could then achieve the most cost-effective water savings by paying 
farmers with the least costly water savings until some budget constraint was met, providing a total 
water savings of 𝑊𝑊∗. 
 
There are some reasons why each of these targeting approaches could have 
adverse consequences. First, an eligibility requirement based on past water use might 
incentivize farmers to ramp up water use prior to enrollment. This is examined with 
the fixed effects regressions of water use. Second, if a policy keeps raising incentives 
over time, the farmer decision rule described above may not hold. Instead, savvy 
farmers may delay their decision to enroll until the next incentive rate hike. Such a 
forward looking farmer would be faced with the following decision. If he enrolls 
now, he is guaranteed 15 years of payments. If he waits to enroll, there are two 
possibilities. He can farm for a few more years, then enroll once a higher incentive 
rate is offered. However, if the program cap is met before the offered rate increases, 





is a significant chance that the program will end before the next rate hike, then only 
those farmers with almost nothing to gain by enrolling today will delay their 
decisions. For CREP, there is a relatively small cap in total acreage enrolled and gaps 
of several years between rate hikes, so that farmers take a considerable risk by 
delaying their decisions.. Thus we can reasonably assume that the farmer decision 
rule described above holds and that farmers do not delay decisions in anticipation of 
rate increases for programs similar to CREP. For a larger scale program, anticipation 
may pose a greater concern. A brief discussion of incentive rate hikes as applied to 
larger policies is provided in the next chapter. 
In addition to the targeting elements used in CREP, the following are some 
ways that similar water rights retirement programs could increase their cost-
effectiveness. First, a policy that pays based on actual water use is more suited to 
target individuals with the lowest profit to savings ratio. To prevent farmers from 
increasing water use to improve their incentive rates, such a policy could base rates 
on water use from before policy initiation. Second, as can be seen in the left panel of 
figure 6.1, for a given water use, the profit to savings ratio can vary substantially. 
Ideally, a targeting approach is able to distinguish between high water users with high 
and low future profits, so that the latter are not paid more than necessary. The next 
section outlines an approach to assess the cost-effectiveness of different incentive 
schemes in the presence of asymmetric information. It assesses policies that use some 
of the targeting approaches outlined in this section. This includes incentive rate 
increases, incentives based on prior water use and policies that pay different 





6.3. Evaluating Cost-Effectiveness of Water Rights Retirement Policies 
This section details the approach taken in this study for evaluating the cost-
effectiveness of alternative incentive-based water rights retirement policies. First, 
enrollment dates from the UAR CREP are used to estimate a panel binary choice 
model of enrollment decisions. The model includes incentive rates and farm 
characteristics as covariates. Second, estimated coefficients from the CREP 
enrollment regression are used to simulate farmer decisions outside of the CREP 
policy region. Water use is known for all individuals outside of the CREP region for 
the years in which the simulations are done. Thus, counterfactual water savings are 
calculated for those farmers who enroll in each policy simulation. Results from the 
enrollment regression are then used to simulate farmer decisions for six incentive-
based policies. Included in the incentive-based policies are policies that pay a 
constant rate per acre; policies that pay a constant rate per AF of prior water use; and 
efficient targeting schemes that pay different rates to different groups. Each of these 
types of policies are simulated with and without incentive rollouts. The policies are 
then assessed and compared based on a measure of absolute cost-effectiveness. The 
process of using econometric estimation to model land use decisions and 
subsequently simulating farmer responses to incentives is sometimes called an 
econometric-based landscape simulation (Plantinga and Lewis 2014).  
First, enrollment decisions are modeled. A farmer is assumed to retire his 
water right if the incentives provided by CREP are more valuable than the future 
profitability of his plot when irrigated. Equation 6.5 shows the present value of future 





not enrolled, 𝜋𝜋𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖0. This depends on farm characteristics 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗 and random components 𝜁𝜁𝑗𝑗  
and 𝑒𝑒𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖0. The term 𝜁𝜁𝑗𝑗  is a random effect that represents a time-invariant component of 
future profits observable to the farmer but not the econometrician. Equation 6.6 
describes the net returns 𝜋𝜋𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖1 from enrolling in CREP. The farmer will then receive a 
net present value payment of 𝜃𝜃𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖  per acre offered to right 𝑗𝑗 in year 𝑡𝑡. The farmer may 
also continue to make profits via dryland farming after 15 years, which depends on 
the vector of farmer characteristics. 
(6.5)    𝜋𝜋𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖0 = 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗′𝛼𝛼 + 𝜁𝜁𝑗𝑗 + 𝑒𝑒𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖0 
(6.6)    𝜋𝜋𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖1 = 𝜃𝜃𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝜅𝜅 + 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗′𝜆𝜆 + 𝑒𝑒𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖1 
The decision to enroll in CREP is then modeled using equation 6.7. A farmer 
will enroll right 𝑗𝑗 in CREP, where Ejt = 1, if 𝜋𝜋𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖1 >  𝜋𝜋𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖0 in year 𝑡𝑡. If the farmer does 
not enroll in a given year, Ejt = 0. To consistently estimate the incentive rate 
parameter, we must assume that farmers do not delay their enrollment decisions in 
anticipation of incentive rate increases. This is thought to be reasonable due to 
reasons discussed in the last section. 
(6.7)    Pr�Ejt� = Pr(𝜋𝜋𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖1 >  𝜋𝜋𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖0) = Pr�𝜃𝜃𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝜅𝜅 + 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗′(𝜆𝜆 − 𝛼𝛼) − 𝜁𝜁𝑗𝑗 > 𝑒𝑒𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖0 − 𝑒𝑒𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖1� 
Enrollment is an irreversible decision, so that once a right is retired, it is 
removed from the sample in subsequent years. Irreversible decisions can be modeled 
using panel binary choice models or duration models, which model timing decisions 
(Cameron and Trivedi 2005). After setting 𝛽𝛽 = 𝜆𝜆 − 𝛼𝛼 and 𝜈𝜈𝑗𝑗 = −𝜁𝜁𝑗𝑗, equation 6.8 





normal or logistic cumulative distribution function, where parameters are estimated 
using either a probit or logit model.  
(6.8)    Pr�Ejt� = F(𝜃𝜃𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝜅𝜅 + 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗′𝛽𝛽 + 𝜈𝜈𝑗𝑗) 
Because equation 6.8 will be used to simulate incentive-based policies, it is 
particularly important for the coefficient of prices to be consistently estimated. This 
requires that individual-level variation in incentive rates is uncorrelated with other 
unobserved influences on enrollment decisions. Incentive rates are set by the USDA 
and the state of Kansas. Variation in rates offered across individuals depend on 
watershed, soil erodibility and irrigation system. Regional differences in rental rates 
reflect differences in average temperatures, rainfall and land quality. Such differences 
are controlled for using regional fixed effects. Further, soil erodibility and irrigation 
system are explicitly included in the model. This mostly leaves variation in incentives 
over time to identify 𝜅𝜅. Variation over time is also institutionally determined. 
Increases are similar for most individuals and are considered to be exogenous.  
Further, because equation 6.8 is a model of irreversible decisions, the random 
effects are necessary to consistently estimate 𝜅𝜅. As seen in table 4.1, spikes in 
enrollment coincide mostly with increases in rental rates. When modeling irreversible 
decisions, a decrease in the enrollment rate over time like that observed can be a 
result of observed or unobserved heterogeneity. Basically, those water rights with 
characteristics that lead CREP to be appealing will enroll early. As rights enroll, those 
with the highest probability of enrolling are gradually removed from the sample, 
leaving the appearance of a decrease in probability of enrollment over time. When the 





heterogeneity can simply be modeled by parameterizing time (Cameron and Trivedi 
2005). However, in this analysis, unobserved heterogeneity must be modeled 
explicitly. If a time trend was used to model heterogeneity, it would lead to an 
undesirable property of the simulations. For two decisions occurring in different years 
but with the same incentive rate, the probability of enrollment assigned to a water 
right would be different. For different simulations with different levels of enrollments 
at any given point, this property could generate erroneous probabilities.  
Binary choice models are estimated using a panel dataset of enrollment 
decisions in CREP. Enrollments are categorized by which year a right was dismissed. 
However, for any rights dismissed past October, the dismissal is attributed to the 
following year. This is because any announcements of rate increases were 
implemented in October, so that any enrollments before the announcement received 
the lower rate and any enrollments after received the higher rate. Each eligible water 
right is then assigned a present value of incentive payments offered each year based 
on information from the Kansas Department of Agriculture. All rights retirements 
from 2008 to 2017 are included in the sample. Only CREP-eligible water units and 
their associated water rights are included in the sample. Eligibility is determined as 
any water unit with at least 0.5 AF/acre of average annual use from 1996 through 
2007. Because water use is only known for water units, it is not possible to determine 
which rights would be determined eligible with the available data. However, 
removing water units with use above an average 0.5 AF/acre is actually stricter than 
the true requirement, which only requires greater than 0.5 AF/acre in four of six past 





screen. Further, any water rights contained in a water unit with an average water use 
above 2.5 AF/acre are eliminated. This eliminates any extreme cases in the sample 
which may be a result of misreporting. Water rights are further screened to avoid 
enrollment decisions being double counted. If a plot of land that is enrolled in CREP 
is associated with multiple water rights, both rights must be retired. Unique plots of 
land are identified by screening for the most senior rights at a particular plot of land.  
A sample is also generated for simulations of enrollments of water rights 
outside of the CREP region. The same screens as with the enrollment regression 
sample are then made. Only rights with associated usage units with average use above 
0.5 AF/acre from 1996 through 2007 are included, corresponding with CREP 
eligibility requirements. Further, usage units with average use above 2.5 AF/acre are 
eliminated for the same reasons as above. Finally, as in the enrollment regression, 
only senior rights are used so that retired land is not double counted. External validity 
is a potential concern when using estimates from one region to simulate enrollment 
decisions in another region. In particular, if the enrollment regression was estimated 
using a sample of water rights completely distinct from the simulated sample of 
rights, then its coefficients would be unlikely to adequately model enrollment 
decisions in the outside sample. To limit this sort of extrapolation, the simulations are 
only conducted in GMD 3 or GMD 5, where most of the CREP region is contained. 
This limitation also allows for the use of GMD fixed effects in the probit model of 
enrollment decisions.  
In table 6.1 and figure 6.2, I show that the enrollment regression and 





table 6.1 shows sample statistics for water rights in the regression and simulation 
samples. Although mean values are significantly different for some observable 
characteristics of water rights (t-tests not shown), the range of values overlaps 
considerably for most observables. This can be judged by observing the 5th and 95th 
percentiles of each sample. For categorical variables such as irrigation type, mean 
values provide proportions for which each category is represented in either sample. 
Second, figure 6.2 depicts the distributions of each of the continuous variables 
graphically. While for some variables there are parts of distributions that do not 
overlap, this accounts for a minimal portion of the total distributions, so that 
extrapolation is of little concern.5 Even though the similar characteristics of water 
rights occur in both samples, they are distributed differently. Thus if there is 
significant unmodeled heterogeneity, external validity could still be a concern. Solon 
et al. (2015) suggests that a good test for model misspecification is to compare the 
unweighted regression model with a model estimated with inverse probability weights 
based on the probability of being selected into the sample. I conduct such a test and it 
does not lead to substantial differences in estimates. Although concerns about 
external validity can never be completely eliminated, we can thus be assured that the 
model used in the next section is reasonably specified. 
A series of three simulations of farmer right retirement decisions are then 
conducted to evaluate the cost-effectiveness of six incentive polices. Each simulation 
uses the estimated parameters from equation 6.8 to predict farmer decisions in the 
                                                 
5 I implicitly assume here that comparing distributions of individual characteristics separately is an 





generated sample outside of the CREP region (see table 6.1) from 2008 through 2017. 
Table 6.2 below provides a summary of how the three simulations are used. The first 
simulation, simulation 1, is used to set incentive rates for each of the six incentive-
based policies analyzed. Because it only relies on pre-2008 water use, it could be used 
by policy makers that want to set future incentive rates. Once simulation 1 is 
conducted, distributions of water savings for a range of incentive rates are calculated 
for each policy. These distributions are used to estimate water savings supply curves,  
Table 6.1: Comparison of Enrollment Regression Sample and Simulation 
Sample 









Avg Water Use per Acre 0.570 1.031 1.733 0.568 1.008 1.605 
Wind Erosion Index 48 102.7 250 48 83.98 134 
Available Water Storage (mm) 116.7 206.6 317.7 151.4 237.9 321.0 
NCCPI 0.115 0.282 0.510 0.177 0.337 0.516 
Slope Gradient 0.161 3.914 13.00 0 2.022 6.500 
Saturated Thickness (ft) 25.26 133.0 289.3 35.49 164.1 340.9 
Missing Sat Thickness 0 0.0214 0 0 0.000697 0 
NICC Level 0-2 0 0.476 1 0 0.519 1 
NICC Level 3-5 0 0.333 1 0 0.440 1 
NICC Level 6-7 0 0.0978 1 0 0.00383 0 
Missing NICC 0 0.104 1 0 0.0968 1 
Corn Grower 0 0.369 1 0 0.561 1 
Alfalfa Grower 0 0.236 0.917 0 0.0716 0.583 
Wheat Grower 0 0.128 0.667 0 0.176 0.875 
Missing Crop Data 0 0.0974 1 0 0.0590 1 
Flood 0 0.0838 1 0 0.0439 0 
Center Pivot 0 0.145 1 0 0.191 1 
Center Pivot - LEPA 0 0.628 1 0 0.663 1 
Missing Irrigation System 0 0.133 1 0 0.0937 1 
Depth to Water (ft) 0 55.89 218 0 76.30 300 
Missing Depth 0 0.462 1 0 0.419 1 
GMD 3 0 0.692 1 0 0.581 1 
GMD 5 0 0.285 1 0 0.419 1 
Number of Water Rights  2,567   5,741  
Note: The table includes data from 2008 for all senior water rights. The regression and simulation samples 
include all water rights with pre-2008 average water use above 0.5 AF per acre (to screen for program 







which are then used to identify the rates for each policy that maximize water savings 
given a budget constraint. More details are provided below. Simulation 2 then 
evaluates the performance of the six policy schemes, using the incentive rates 
determined by simulation 1. This simulation evaluates post-2008 water savings for 
each policy had it been designed prior to 2008, with incentive rates based on pre-2008 
average water use. This simulation is used to calculate distributions of total savings, 
total number of enrollments, and cost per savings of each policy.  
 
 
Figure 6.2: Comparison of distributions of continuous variables for regression 





Finally, the cost-effectiveness of the six policies is compared using simulation 
3. Simulation 3 calculates the cost per savings of a policy that pays farmers their 
exact opportunity cost for their water right. This calculation serves two purposes. 
First, the cost per savings of a perfect targeting policy provides a way to compare 
policies with different levels of average water savings. Second, it measures how 
costly each policy is compared to a perfect targeting policy. The results of the 
simulation are used to estimate a supply curve of water savings as in figure 6.1 for 
incentive rates based on post-2008 water use. The supply curve is used to calculate 
the cost per savings of the perfect targeting policy. A metric of absolute cost-
effectiveness for each policy is then calculated as the ratio of cost per savings for 
each incentive policy and the perfect targeting policy. Ultimately, only simulation 1 
can be used by policy makers who want to design new programs. However, 
simulations 2 and 3 are used in this study to evaluate the performance of potential 
policies. They take advantage of real water use data to calculate water savings for 
counterfactual policies conducted from 2008 through 2017. 
Six different policies are investigated in the simulations of farmer enrollment 
decisions, summarized in table 6.3 below. First, I look at policies that set incentive 
rates based on total acreage retired. The first policy sets a per-acre incentive rate that 
remains constant across the entire policy period of 2008 through 2017. The second 
policy increases rates over time. Similarly to CREP, rates are increased by $200 per 
acre in 2012 and by $400 per acre in 2016. Thus, this incentive scheme can be 
thought of as a “synthetic CREP” policy. Next, two policies are simulated that pay 





constant across the policy period. For the second policy, rates increase by $200 per 
AF in 2012 and by $300 per AF in 2016. Finally, a policy is used that assigns 
different per AF rates to different farmers based on a combination of predicted 
profitability and past water use. 
Table 6.2: Overview of Simulations Used in Cost-Effectiveness Calculations 
Simulation 
number 
Simulation Purpose Data Used for 
Setting 
Incentives 
Data Used for 
Calculating 
Savings  
Can be used in 
determining 
future policies? 
1 Estimate water savings 
supply curves to set 
optimal incentive rates 
for 6 incentive-based 
policies 
Avg annual 
water use from 
1996-2007 
Avg annual 
water use from 
1996-2007 
Yes 
2 Calculate cost per savings 
given optimal incentive 
rates from simulation 1 
Avg annual 
water use from 
1996-2007 
Avg annual 
water use from 
2008-2016 
No 
3 Estimate water savings 
supply curve to calculate 
baseline costs per savings 
Avg annual 
water use from 
2008-2016 
Avg annual 




Each simulation uses the estimated parameters from equation 6.8 to predict 
farmer decisions in the generated sample outside of the CREP region (table 6.1) from 
2008 through 2017. Probabilities of enrollment must be generated for each water right 
in each policy year. Given some per-acre incentive rate, probabilities of enrollment of 
right 𝑗𝑗 in year 𝑡𝑡, 𝑃𝑃�jt, are created for a given incentive level, corresponding with 
equation 6.9. If per use incentives are used, they must be multiplied by pre-2008 
average per-acre water use for the associated water unit of a right to get a per acre 





Table 6.3: Overview of Policies Assessed in Cost-Effectiveness Comparison 
Policy Scenario Payment Type Rate Increases Who Is Paid What? 
Per Acre 
(constant) 
Payment based on 
total acreage 
retired  
Same rates offered 
throughout simulated 
policy period 
All eligible rights get 
paid same per acre rate 
in any given year 
Per Acre (rollout), 
“Synthetic CREP” 
Payment based on 
total acreage 
retired 
Rates offered increase 
by $200 per acre in 
2012 and $400 per acre 
in 2016 
All eligible rights get 
paid same per acre rate 
in any given year 
Per AF (constant) 
Payment based on 
avg AF of annual 
water use from 
1996-2007 
Same rates offered 
throughout simulated 
policy period 
All eligible rights get 
paid same per AF rate 
in any given year 
Per AF (rollout) 
Payment based on 
avg AF of annual 
water use from 
1996-2007 
Rates offered increase 
by $200 per AF in 
2012 and $300 per AF 
in 2016 
All eligible rights get 
paid same per AF rate 
in any given year 
Targeted 
(constant) 
Payment based on 
avg AF of annual 
water use from 
1996-2007 
Same rates offered 
throughout simulated 
policy period 
Each bin of expected 
profits and past water 
use is given same per 
AF rate in any given 
year 
Targeted (rollout) 
Payment based on 
avg AF of annual 
water use from 
1996-2007 
Rates offered increase 
by $200 per AF in 
2012 and $300 per AF 
in 2016 
Each bin of expected 
profits and past water 
use is given same per 
AF rate in any given 
year 
 
.5 AF/acre on average from 1996 through 2007, will receive a payment of 𝜃𝜃𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 =
 $500/acre. The same right-hand side variables used in the enrollment regression are 
used to predict the probability of enrollment for farmers outside the CREP region for 
the years 2008 through 2017. In order to generate random effects ?̂?𝜈𝑗𝑗 , values can be 
randomly drawn from the estimated distribution of random effects from equation 6.8.  
(6.9)    𝑃𝑃�jt = F(𝜃𝜃𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖?̂?𝜅 + 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗′?̂?𝛽 + ?̂?𝜈𝑗𝑗) 
Enrollment decisions are then determined using Monte Carlo simulations. 





a random effect, according to the estimated distribution of random effects from 
equation 6.8. Given each water right’s random effect, farmer characteristics, and a 
given incentive rate, it is assigned a probability of enrollment for each year in the 
sample. Second, for each water right numbers are drawn for each year from 0 to 1 
using a uniform distribution. If the value drawn is less than the generated probability 
in a particular year for a particular incentive rate, the right retires (Lewis and 
Plantinga 2007). Once a water right is retired, it remains retired for the remainder of 
the simulated policy period. The total cost for a given incentive policy is calculated 
by multiplying the per acre incentive rate offered to each particular individual that 
enrolls in the year that they enroll by their total acreage enrolled. The water manager 
is assumed to pay the incentive rate at which that right retires for the remainder of the 
policy period. A budget constraint for total annual payments of a policy is set such 
that once passed in a given year, no more enrollments are allowed in any of the 
following years. The number of total enrollments for a particular round of the 
simulation is calculated as the number of water rights in the sample that enroll at 
some point. Finally, the average post-2008 water use for all the enrolled rights are 
added together to generate a calculation for total water savings. For each incentive 
rate, this procedure is performed 100 times.  
Simulation 1 is used to set per acre incentive rates for each policy. For the per 
acre incentive that is constant over time, 100 simulations are run for per acre rates 
ranging from $800 per acre to $2200 per acre in $100 increments. A set of 100 
simulations are also run for per acre rates that increase over time. After setting 





are increased by $200 in 2012, and by $400 per acre in 2016. Next, incentives rates 
are generated for two policies that pay incentives based on pre-2008 water use. 
Similar simulations are run to set the optimal per AF rates. One rate is constant across 
the policy period. For a second policy, rates increase by $200 per AF in 2012 and by 
$300 per AF in 2016. Total water savings and total costs are recorded for each 
simulation, using pre-2008 water use as a proxy for post-2008 water use. Because it is 
desirable to design a targeting approach that can be used by policy makers, relying on 
real future water use would make this procedure impossible. 
Using the results of each policy simulation, quadratic savings supply 
regressions are estimated for each policy, with total savings as the dependent variable 
and 2008 incentive rates as the independent variable. In particular, the results of the 
simulation are used to estimate equation 6.10. In the equation 𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠 represents the 
amount paid per AF of past use in simulation round 𝑠𝑠. Total annual water use for 
those enroll in a given simulation round is given by 𝑊𝑊𝑠𝑠. An error term is given by 𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠. 
Using these savings supply curves, I solve for the incentive rate of each policy that 
yields the maximum expected water savings given a budget of $25 million.  
(6.10)    𝑊𝑊𝑠𝑠 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠 + 𝛼𝛼2𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠2 + 𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠 
Finally, incentives are generated based on a targeting scheme that pays 
different rates to multiple groups. Again, I examine one policy that pays the same rate 
over time and one that increases incentive rates two times in the policy period. The 
creation of targeted incentive rates requires four main steps. First, the sample must be 
separated into bins based on predicted profits and water use. In equation 6.9, the 





where the incentive rate depends on water use. The marginal impact is not just from 
the incentive rate because of the nonlinearity of probit models. Further, because of the 
random component unobservable to the econometrician, only the expected probability 
of a given individual enrolling can be known. Expected profits from water right 𝑗𝑗 can 
be defined as 𝜋𝜋�𝑗𝑗 = 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗′?̂?𝛽 and predicted water use can be generated based on the 
regression described above. Both of these values can then be used to split the 
generated sample into bins of expected profits and water use. Second, simulations are 
used to estimate supply curves of water savings for each bin for a static policy and 
one which increases incentive rates twice in the policy period (increases by $200 per 
AF in 2012 and by $300 per AF in 2016). Third, supply curves are used to create 
efficient targeting policies that set rates specific to each bin. The efficient policies are 
determined using equation 6.11. The objective is to maximize the savings of expected 
payments 𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏(𝜃𝜃𝑏𝑏) for a given per-AF incentive rate 𝜃𝜃𝑏𝑏 for bin 𝑏𝑏, subject to the budget 
constraint 𝐶𝐶. The total cost is the sum across all bins of the per-AF incentive rate for 
each bin multiplied by the savings at that rate. If 𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏(𝜃𝜃𝑏𝑏) is strictly increasing in 𝜃𝜃𝑏𝑏 
and therefore quasiconcave, then equation 6.11 satisfies theorem 3.6.3 in Sydsæter et 
al. (2008) for a local maximum to be global. We can then numerically solve for the 
per AF rates in an efficient targeting policy using a local maximizer.6  




𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏(𝜃𝜃𝑏𝑏)  𝑠𝑠. 𝑡𝑡.  ∑
𝑏𝑏
𝜃𝜃𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏(𝜃𝜃𝑏𝑏) ≤ 𝐶𝐶  
The following are the results of the first simulation routine. The per acre 
incentive policy that remains constant over the entire period is set at a rate of $1,754 
                                                 





per acre. Next, the per acre rollout policy sets an initial incentive rate of $1,552 per 
acre in 2008, then increases to $1,752 in 2012 and to $2,152 in 2016. Next are 
policies that set incentives based on pre-2008 water use. The constant policy sets a 
rate of $1,388 per AF of average pre-2008 water use. The rollout policy sets a rate of 
$1200 per AF of average pre-2008 use in 2008, then increases to $1400 per AF in 
2012, and to $1700 per AF in 2016. Finally, incentive rates are set for the policy that 
offers different incentive rates to different farmers based on average pre-2008 water 
use. Because of the small number of enrollments in simulations, supply curves cannot 
be reliably estimated for a large number of bins. Thus only two bins were used for the 
simulation in this analysis. However, in applications with a large number of 
enrollments, the bin technique could potentially provide much more substantial gains 
in efficiency. 
Simulation 2 is then used to evaluate the performance of the incentive rates set 
using simulation 1. It does this by taking advantage of data from 2008 to 2017 to test 
the performance of incentive rates had they been set in 2008 using data from 1996 
through 2007. Unlike simulation 1, simulation 2 does not require multiple steps. It 
simply runs enrollment simulations for each policy approach and then calculates 
statistics based on actual behavior of farms that enroll in each simulation run. Then 
the distributions of total savings, total number of enrollments, and cost per savings of 
each of the six incentive designs are calculated. 
To compare the cost-effectiveness of the six incentive-based policies from 
simulation 2, results for each policy is compared with results from simulation 3, 





used to estimate an inverse supply curve of water savings for a policy that perfectly 
targets rights. The supply curve is then used as a baseline to assess the cost-
effectiveness of alternative incentive-based policies. Per-acre incentive rates are first 
created for each individual water right in the simulation sample. Incentives are 
generated by multiplying post-2008 average per-acre water use for the associated 
water unit of a right by per-use incentive rates. For example, at an incentive rate of 
$900/AF, a water right that uses .5 AF/acre on average from 2008 through 2016, will 
receive a payment of 𝜃𝜃𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 = $450/acre. Incentive rates here are constant across time, so 
that the subscript 𝑡𝑡 is superfluous. Once incentive rates are generated, probabilities of 
enrollment are generated as with other simulations, using results from equation 6.8. 
Probabilities are generated for incentive rates ranging from $500/AF to $1400/AF in 
$100 increments and the simulation routine described above is used to generate 
sample statistics for policies at each incentive rate. 
An inverse supply curve of water savings is then estimated using the results of 
the perfect foresight simulation. In particular, the results of the simulation are used to 
estimate equation 6.12. In the equation 𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠 represents the per AF incentive rate, or the 
cost per AF paid for simulation round 𝑠𝑠. Total water savings of a given simulation 
round is given by 𝑊𝑊𝑠𝑠. This curve is used to calculate the cost-effectiveness of a policy 
that targets each individual perfectly. Total costs of the perfect targeting policy are 
calculated by taking the integral under the supply curve for a given water savings 
level, as shown in the right panel of figure 6.1. Cost per savings of the perfect 
targeting policy is then calculated as the total cost divided by total water savings. 





Once the supply curve of water savings for a perfect targeting policy is 
generated, it can be used as a baseline to measure the absolute cost-effectiveness of 
more plausible incentive schemes.7 A similar simulation routine as described above is 
used to calculate water savings, total costs, and total enrollments for six incentive-
based policies. These policies set incentive rates based on acreage enrolled and prior 
water use, either uniform or differentiated for different water rights. Each type of 














                                                 






Chapter 7:  Results of CREP Analysis 
7.1. Fixed Effects 
This section provides regression results measuring the water savings attributable to 
enrollments in CREP. Water use trends and farmer characteristics are compared 
between enrolled and unenrolled units in the CREP region. These comparisons 
motivate the need to estimate water use regressions using a matched sample. Then, 
fixed effects regressions using the matched sample are estimated to assess the impact 
of the amount enrolled in CREP on water use.  
Identification of the fixed effects regressions relies on the key assumption that 
enrolled and unenrolled units would have similar water use trends in the absence of 
CREP. Figure 7.1 plots the mean annual water use per acre for enrolled and 
unenrolled units from 1996 to 2016. The figure provides water use trends for 
unenrolled units in all of Kansas and of unenrolled units only in the CREP region. In 
the years before 2008, water use per acre of enrolled units is higher than either group 
of unenrolled units. As I discuss below, the differences are only partially due to 
CREP eligibility requirements, which exclude low water use units from enrolling. 
Despite differences in use per acre, there do not appear to be differing trends in water 
use between enrolled and unenrolled units in the pre-policy period. However, after 
policy initiation in 2008, water use diverges between enrolled and unenrolled units. 
As more acreage is enrolled, average water use continues to decrease for enrolled 
units.  
Even if enrolled and unenrolled units have similar pre-policy water use trends, 






Figure 7.1: Use per acre over time for treatment and unmatched controls 
Note: Water use trends between the treatment and control groups can only be directly compared in the 
years before 2008, when the policy began. A vertical line separates water use before and after 2008. 
After 2008, the average water use of the enrolled group sharply declines over time as a greater number 
of water rights are enrolled. 
 
the sample means of the enrolled and unenrolled units in the entire CREP region, as 
well as p-values for t-tests of the differences in means. There are several significant 
differences in means of covariates. There are large differences between the two 
groups in the wind erosion index (WEI) and the non-irrigated capability class. These 
difference are unsurprising, as the UAR CREP explicitly uses these criteria in setting 
incentive rates. There are also large differences in means for characteristics that are 
not used to set incentives. For example, differences in the national commodity crop 
productivity index (NCCPI), a general index of soil productivity, are very large 





authorized) are highly significant. Finally, on average water use per acre for enrolled 
units is well above eligibility requirements and is significantly higher than the water 
use of unenrolled units. This implies that less valuable water rights, those that enroll 
in CREP, do not necessarily have lower water use.  
Table 7.1: Difference in Means of All Enrolled and Unenrolled Water Units in 
CREP Region 
 Not Enrolled Enrolled p-value 
Wind Erosion Index 91.86 178.7 1.1e-62 
National Commodity Crop Productivity Index 0.326 0.183 9.2e-34 
Slope Gradient 3.169 8.506 4.6e-37 
Non-Irrigated Capability Class 2.853 5.356 2.6e-45 
Sat Thickness (in feet) 123.1 155.5 0.000083 
Missing Sat Thickness 0.0154 0.0192 0.76 
Depth to Water (in feet) 62.65 95.47 0.00014 
Missing Depth 0.380 0.442 0.20 
Net Acres Authorized 300.1 485.3 0.00000026 
Avg Water Use per Acre (AF/Acre) 0.918 1.233 9.8e-10 
Number of Water Units 2,334 104  
 
Because the unmatched sample has such poor covariate balance, a one-to-one 
match of enrolled units to unenrolled units without replacement is created based on 
the observables in table 7.1. Calipers are set so that for each matched pair of units, all 
covariate values must be within one standard deviation of each other. As shown in 
table 7.2, the matched control group is very similar to the treated group for all 
variables. All but one of the variables have insignificant differences between the 
enrolled and unenrolled groups. Only the difference in the wind erosion index is 
significant, with a p-value of 0.099. A total of 100 enrolled units are matched to 
unenrolled units. Four enrolled units are left unmatched and are removed from the 





represent the treated population (Ferraro and Miranda 2017). However, four 
observations are unlikely to change the marginal effects much, so that any bias 
resulting from omission should be small.  
Table 7.2: Difference in Means of Enrolled and Caliper Matched Unenrolled 
Units 
 Not Enrolled Enrolled p-value 
Wind Erosion Index 163.0 179.3 0.099 
National Commodity Crop Productivity Index 0.193 0.182 0.31 
Slope Gradient 8.538 8.525 0.99 
Non-Irrigated Capability Class 5.230 5.380 0.60 
Sat Thickness (in feet) 164.0 155.3 0.42 
Missing Sat Thickness 0.0200 0.0200 1 
Depth to Water (in feet) 91.95 95.76 0.80 
Missing Depth 0.450 0.450 1 
Net Acres Authorized 387.5 398.2 0.84 
Avg Water Use per Acre (AF/Acre) 1.240 1.259 0.79 
Number of Water Units 100 100  
 
Figure 7.2 provides mean values of annual water use per acre from 1996 to 
2016 for enrolled units and unenrolled units from the caliper matched sample. 
Unenrolled units have similar levels and trends in water use per acre as the enrolled 
units. The unenrolled group closely matches trends in pre-2008 water use per acre for 
the enrolled group. Propensity score matching is also used as an alternative matching 
approach. Because the caliper matching technique outperforms the propensity score 
matching technique in both covariate balance and trends, as we will see, it is used as 
the main approach in estimating fixed effects water use regressions. However, the 
covariate balance, parallel trends, and fixed effects regressions using propensity score 






Figure 7.2: Use per acre over time for treatment and caliper matched controls 
Note: Water use trends between the treatment and control groups can only be directly compared in the 
years before 2008, when the policy began. A vertical line separates water use before and after 2008. 
After 2008, the average water use of the enrolled group sharply declines over time as a greater number 
of water rights are enrolled. 
 
Tables 7.3 and 7.4 provide results of fixed effects regressions estimating the 
effects of acre-feet per acre and proportion of authorized acres enrolled in CREP on 
annual water use per acre, respectively. Each regression includes 100 enrolled and 
100 unenrolled units from the sample created using caliper matching, for 21 years 
from 1996 to 2016. The first two columns of each table provide results which 
correspond with equations 6.1 and 6.2. The coefficient of most interest in each 
regression is the effect of the amount enrolled in CREP once irrigation is required to 
cease completely on an enrolled plot of land. Coefficients for anticipation and 





water rights are fully retired. Standard errors are clustered by water unit for all fixed 
effects regressions.  
Column 1 of table 7.3 provides results for a specification corresponding to 
equation 6.1. Each AF of authorized use that a water unit enrolls in CREP reduces 
annual water use by 0.776 AF, once farmers are required to cease irrigation 
completely. Farmers reduce water use by about half that amount in the three years 
directly after enrollment, when some water use is authorized to establish a 
conservation crop. GMD-year effects are included to control for annual influences on 
water use that may vary across space, such as temperature or rainfall. Column 2 
provides results that correspond to equation 6.2. This regression allows for the 
possibility that farmers adjust water use after the program is announced. The table 
indicates that farmers do not increase water use to qualify for the program, and if 
anything, ramp down use in the immediate years before enrollment. When 
anticipation effects are allowed, the effect of enrollment on water use changes to 
0.816 AF for every AF retired. Both columns 1 and 2 suggest that farmers would use 
a high proportion of their authorized water use had they not enrolled in CREP. 
Further, the portion is well above the eligibility requirement that specifies that 
farmers that enroll must use more than 50% in a set of specified prior years. This 
large impact implies that farmers that enroll are not simply those who use close to the 
eligibility requirement. As a further point of comparison, eligible unenrolled units in 
the CREP region used 72% of their total authorized use in the post-policy period of 





Table 7.3: Effect of AF per Acre Retired in CREP on AF per Acre Water Use of 
Water Unit (Caliper Matched) 
 
Table 7.4 provides results for the water savings effect of the proportion of a 
water unit’s authorized acreage retired in CREP. The results are similar to those in 
table 7.3, but the coefficients are larger. In the regression without anticipation effects, 
an acre retired results in an average of 1.446 AF of reduced water use. The effect 
increases slightly to 1.522 AF when anticipation effects are included, reflecting the 
same ramp down effect of the policy. The effect for retired acreage is almost twice 
the effect of retired acre-feet authorized, which is due to the nearly two to one ratio of 
acre-feet retired versus acreage retired (see table 4.1). The effects in table 7.4 can be 
compared to the other CREP eligibility requirement that farmers must apply more 
than 0.5 AF per acre on enrolled land in a set of specified years prior to enrolling. The 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES FE FE FE 
    
Anticipation (AF/acre)  -0.159*** -0.171*** 
  (0.035) (0.035) 
After Enrolling (AF/acre) -0.375*** -0.431*** -0.429*** 
 (0.026) (0.031) (0.032) 
No Irrigation Allowed (AF/acre) -0.776*** -0.816*** -0.796*** 
 (0.027) (0.026) (0.029) 
GMD X Year FEs Included Included Included 
    
Late Year FEs Not Included Not Included Included 
    
Constant 1.138*** 1.138*** 1.138*** 
 (0.038) (0.037) (0.038) 
    
Observations 4,200 4,200 4,200 
R-squared 0.523 0.532 0.540 
Number of Water Units 200 200 200 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 





results suggest that farmers would have used about three times that amount on the 
land that they retired. This confirms the above result that enrollments in CREP lead to 
water savings far above what one would expect based on eligibility requirements.  
Table 7.4: Effect of Proportion of Acreage Retired in CREP on AF per Acre 
Water Use of Water Unit (Caliper Matched) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES FE FE FE 
    
Anticipation (% of total acreage)  -0.292*** -0.321*** 
  (0.062) (0.062) 
After Enrolling (% of total acreage) -0.688*** -0.794*** -0.790*** 
 (0.049) (0.057) (0.059) 
No Irrigation Allowed (% of total acreage) -1.446*** -1.522*** -1.477*** 
 (0.054) (0.053) (0.057) 
GMD X Year FEs Included Included Included 
    
Late Year FEs Not Included Not Included Included 
    
Constant 1.138*** 1.138*** 1.138*** 
 (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) 
    
Observations 4,200 4,200 4,200 
R-squared 0.516 0.525 0.534 
Number of Water Units 200 200 200 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Standard errors clustered by water unit are in parentheses 
 
Next, we examine whether accounting for dynamic selection bias changes the 
results. Figure 7.3 shows water use trends over time for early and late enrolled units 
and their caliper matched unenrolled units. Prior to program initiation, late 
enrollments and their matches use less water per acre than early enrollments. 
However, trends still appear to be parallel. Regressions are conducted that account for 
the possibility that units that enroll late in the program differ from early enrollees. 





their matches, corresponding with equation 6.3. Results are provided in the third 
columns of tables 7.3 and 7.4. The coefficients from these regressions do not differ 
much from those in column 2 of the same tables, suggesting that dynamic selection 
bias is a minor concern. In general all of the regressions in tables 7.3 and 7.4 suggest 
that CREP results in a large amount of water savings for those that enroll.  
  
Figure 7.3: Use per acre over time for treatment and caliper matched controls, 
late and early enrollments 
Note: Water use trends between the treatment and control groups can only be directly compared in the 
years before 2008, when the policy began. A vertical line separates water use before and after 2008. 
After 2008, the average water use of the enrolled group sharply declines over time as a greater number 
of water rights are enrolled. 
 
We now conduct water use regressions using propensity score matching to 
show that the results do not depend on the matching approach used. First, a probit 
regression is run to predict the probability of being an enrolled unit in the CREP 





of the probit regression are shown in table 7.5. Many of the same variables that 
explain differences between enrolled and unenrolled units also predict CREP 
enrollment. Predicted probabilities of enrollment are generated from the regression 
and used to match each enrolled unit to an unenrolled unit. A one-to-one matching 
routine without replacement is used, where each enrolled unit is matched with the 
unenrolled unit from inside or outside the CREP region with the closest propensity 
score. Covariate balance of the propensity score match is tested in table 7.6. The 
enrolled and unenrolled units have much closer observables than in the unmatched 
sample. However, the caliper matching approach results in better covariate balance 
than the propensity score matching approach. The main advantage of this approach is 
that it matches all 104 treatment units. Figure 7.4 shows annual water use trends from 
1996 to 2016 for enrolled units and unenrolled units from the propensity score 
matched sample. Unenrolled units have similar levels and trends in water use per acre 
as the enrolled units. However, levels do not match as closely as with the caliper 
matched sample. 
Columns 1 and 2 of tables 7.7 and 7.8 provide results from fixed effects 
regression of annual water use per acre for water units matched using propensity 
scores, corresponding with equations 6.1 and 6.2. Coefficients from these regressions 
are similar to those using caliper matching. By and large, these results do not differ 
much from those from the caliper matched sample. I also estimate fixed effects 
regressions with propensity score matching using the specification in equation 6.3. 
Figure 7.5 provides water use trends for early and late enrollees and their matched 





both groups of enrolled and unenrolled units. However, water use from the caliper 
matched sample matches more closely. Despite this slight discrepancy, columns 2 and 
3 of tables 7.7 and 7.8 yield similar results, again suggesting that dynamic selection is 
also a minor concern for the propensity score matched sample. 
 
Table 7.5: Water Unit Propensity to Enroll Some Acres 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Probit SE 
   
Wind Erosion Index 0.0189*** (0.00283) 
National Commodity Crop Productivity Index -4.117*** (1.385) 
Slope Gradient -0.244*** (0.0359) 
Non-Irrigated Capability Class = 2 a -0.117 (0.315) 
Non-Irrigated Capability Class = 3 a 0.0566 (0.263) 
Non-Irrigated Capability Class = 4 a 0.332 (0.272) 
Non-Irrigated Capability Class = 6 a 0.987*** (0.284) 
Non-Irrigated Capability Class = 7 a 1.207*** (0.356) 
Sat Thickness -0.00370*** (0.000982) 
Missing Sat Thickness -0.782* (0.428) 
Depth to Water (in feet) 0.00205** (0.000826) 
Missing Depth 0.432** (0.172) 
Net Acres Authorized 0.000359*** (0.000108) 
Avg Water Use per Acre (AF/Acre) 0.0762 (0.121) 
Constant -2.224*** (0.599) 
   
Number of Water Units 16,308  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Standard errors in parentheses 
a Default category is NICC = 0. No enrollees had levels 1 and 5, so these categories were not 












Table 7.6: Difference in Means of Enrolled and Propensity Matched Unenrolled 
Units 
 Not Enrolled Enrolled p-value 
Wind Erosion Index 166.6 178.7 0.22 
National Commodity Crop Productivity Index 0.226 0.183 0.00020 
Slope Gradient 6.200 8.506 0.00093 
Non-Irrigated Capability Class 4.731 5.356 0.024 
Sat Thickness 128.7 155.5 0.0096 
Missing Sat Thickness 0.0192 0.0192 1 
Depth to Water (in feet) 83.03 95.47 0.64 
Missing Depth 0.471 0.442 0.68 
Net Acres Authorized 387.2 485.3 0.21 
Avg Water Use per Acre (AF/Acre) 0.974 1.233 0.00078 












Figure 7.4: Use per acre over time for treatment and propensity score matched 
controls 
Note: Water use trends between the treatment and control groups can only be directly compared in the 
years before 2008, when the policy began. A vertical line separates water use before and after 2008. 
After 2008, the average water use of the enrolled group sharply declines over time as a greater number 















Table 7.7: Effect of AF per Acre Retired in CREP on AF per Acre Water Use of 
Water Unit (Propensity Matched) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES FE FE FE 
    
Anticipation (AF/acre)  -0.130*** -0.139*** 
  (0.036) (0.036) 
After Enrolling (AF/acre) -0.348*** -0.401*** -0.386*** 
 (0.026) (0.032) (0.034) 
No Irrigation Allowed (AF/acre) -0.754*** -0.792*** -0.776*** 
 (0.027) (0.026) (0.028) 
GMD X Year FEs Included Included Included 
    
Late Year FEs Not Included Not Included Included 
    
Constant 1.010*** 1.010*** 1.010*** 
 (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) 
    
Observations 4,368 4,368 4,368 
R-squared 0.547 0.552 0.563 
Number of water units 208 208 208 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 


























Table 7.8: Effect of Proportion of Acreage Retired in CREP on AF per Acre 
Water Use of Water Unit (Propensity Matched) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES FE FE FE 
    
Anticipation (% of total acreage)  -0.233*** -0.256*** 
  (0.063) (0.064) 
After Enrolling (% of total acreage) -0.637*** -0.735*** -0.706*** 
 (0.049) (0.059) (0.062) 
No Irrigation Allowed (% of total acreage) -1.402*** -1.474*** -1.432*** 
 (0.054) (0.053) (0.058) 
GMD X Year FEs Included Included Included 
    
Late Year FEs Not Included Not Included Included 
    
Constant 1.010*** 1.010*** 1.010*** 
 (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) 
    
Observations 4,368 4,368 4,368 
R-squared 0.540 0.545 0.557 
Number of water units 208 208 208 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 












Figure 7.5: Use per acre over time for treatment and propensity score matched 
controls, late and early enrollments 
Note: Water use trends between the treatment and control groups can only be directly compared in the 
years before 2008, when the policy began. A vertical line separates water use before and after 2008. 
After 2008, the average water use of the enrolled group sharply declines over time as a greater number 
















7.2. Probability of Enrollment and Simulation 
The following section provides results for the cost-effectiveness analysis of incentive-
based water rights retirement programs. First, enrollment decisions in the CREP 
policy region are modeled to determine which factors influence the probability of 
enrollment. Results for random effects probit and logit models as specified in 
equation 6.8 are provided in table 7.9. Columns 1 and 2 provide coefficients for 
probit and logit models of enrollment, respectively. To calculate the net present value 
(NPV) of incentive rates, first the NPV of annual FSA rental payments is calculated 
assuming a 3% interest rate for 15 years of payments. Net present values for rental 
payments are then added to one-time payments from Kansas to get total CREP 
payments, which are then converted to 2018 dollars using the GDP deflator. In both 
columns 1 and 2, increases in NPV of CREP payments have a significant positive 
impact on enrollment. This effect reflects the pattern seen in table 4.1, where most 
enrollments occur immediately or soon after rate increases. Importantly, there is 
significant unobserved heterogeneity in each regression. The statistic called rho is a 
function of the estimated standard deviation of the random effects in each regression. 
Likelihood ratio tests determine whether the hypothesis that rho equals zero can be 
rejected. In both cases, the chi-squared statistics for these tests are very high, 
suggesting that unobserved heterogeneity plays an important role in modeling 
enrollment. Conventional standard errors are used for each enrollment regression. 
The effects of most other covariates on enrollment are similar between the two 
models. A higher wind erosion index significantly increases the probability of 





plots. This implies that WEI influences the value of water rights even after accounting 
for regional differences in irrigated land values. A few other factors have significant 
coefficients with the expected signs. Having a higher soil productivity, as measured 
by a higher national commodity crop productivity index, leads to a significantly 
smaller probability of enrolling in CREP. A lower saturated thickness increases the 
probability of enrollment. A higher depth to water also increases the probability of 
enrollment, but the effect is only statistically significant in the logit model. 
Surprisingly, having a higher slope gradient decreases the probability of enrolling in 
CREP. GMD fixed effects are intended to measure time invariant heterogeneity 
across space. The default category is no GMD, meaning that a water right is located 
in a region not under the jurisdiction of a GMD. The GMD fixed effects are large but 
only significant in one case, suggesting that there may be regional differences in the 
value of water rights that are not reflected in differences in incentive rates. Finally, 
water use has a surprising impact on the probability of enrollment in CREP. In the 
probit model, water use has no significant impact on enrollment and in the logit 
model it positively predicts enrollment. This result provides a partial explanation for 
the high water use savings attributable to CREP found in the last section.  
Using results from the estimated probit model from table 7.9, policy 
simulations of enrollment decisions are run to evaluate the cost-effectiveness of 
alternative incentive-based retirement policies. Table 7.10 provides sample statistics 
evaluating the six main policy scenarios and includes a measure of the absolute cost-
effectiveness with which to compare policies. Absolute cost-effectiveness for a given 





Table 7.9: Binary Choice Regressions of CREP Enrollment 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Random Effects Probit Random Effects Logit 
   
NPV of CREP payments 0.00209*** 0.00279*** 
 (0.000407) (0.000621) 
Wind Erosion Index 0.0531*** 0.0636*** 
 (0.00967) (0.0105) 
Available Water Storage 0.00199 -0.000430 
 (0.00777) (0.0103) 
National Commodity Crop Productivity Index -10.42** -13.32** 
 (4.542) (5.708) 
Slope Gradient -0.510*** -0.616*** 
 (0.110) (0.110) 
Saturated Thickness (ft) -0.0113*** -0.0148*** 
 (0.00309) (0.00404) 
Missing Sat Thickness -0.586 -0.549 
 (2.449) (3.689) 
NICC Level 3-5 a -0.757 -1.047 
 (0.607) (0.685) 
NICC Level 6-7 a 0.283 0.249 
 (0.862) (1.016) 
Missing NICC -1.668** -2.093** 
 (0.792) (0.945) 
Corn Grower -1.125 -1.721 
 (1.009) (1.412) 
Alfalfa Grower 0.986 1.636 
 (0.790) (1.034) 
Wheat Grower -0.289 -0.292 
 (1.274) (1.764) 
Missing Crop Data 2.984* 3.815 
 (1.688) (2.479) 
Center Pivot b 1.500 1.982 
 (1.413) (1.757) 
Center Pivot – LEPAb 0.931 1.231 
 (1.247) (1.654) 
Missing Irrigation System 0.190 0.369 
 (1.902) (2.756) 
Depth to Water 0.00564 0.00936** 
 (0.00365) (0.00429) 
Missing Depth 1.149 1.731* 
 (0.731) (0.890) 
Avg Water Use per Acre 0.952 1.225* 
 (0.606) (0.704) 
GMD 3 c -0.762 -0.956 
 (2.684) (3.666) 
GMD 5 c -4.628 -6.993* 
 (2.901) (4.143) 
   
   
Constant -13.77*** -18.85*** 
 (3.546) (5.158) 
   
Observations 23,696 23,696 
Number of Water Units 2,441 2,441 
rho d 0.923 0.880 
X2 of LR test 101.6 97.31 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
a Default category is NICC Level 0-2 
b Default category is flood irrigation system 
c Default category is no GMD 





the perfect targeting policy at the average level of water savings obtained from the 
imperfect policy. A policy with an absolute cost-effectiveness of 1 pays all farmers 
who enroll their exact opportunity cost. Table 7.10 suggests that the policy that pays 
different rates to different farmers and that increases rates over time performs the 
best. On average, the program is 1.53 times the cost of the optimal policy. The rollout 
policy that pays a uniform rate per AF of prior water use performs nearly as well. The 
synthetic CREP policy has an absolute cost-effectiveness of 1.8 times the cost of the 
optimal policy. These results suggest that per AF incentives could improve the cost-
effectiveness of CREP substantially. 



































































Real CREP 122.00 30,170.59 1,144.44   
Note: Standard deviations from simulation of 100 runs are in parentheses. Values for optimal policy 
are derived by taking the integral of the estimated inverse water savings supply curve up to the mean 
savings for that policy. Because cost per unit saved are increasing in savings, policies with higher 
expected water savings have higher costs for the optimal policy. The values for “Real CREP” are 
calculated using actual enrollments and incentive rates in the UAR CREP region. All simulated 





The absolute cost-effectiveness is determined using the three simulations 
described before. First, policy simulations of enrollments are conducted to set the 
incentive rates that maximize expected water savings for six incentive-based policies, 
given a budget constraint of $25 million (simulation 1). Each simulation uses pre-
2008 average water use as a proxy for future water savings. A second simulation is 
then run to determine the cost per unit saved of each incentive scheme (simulation 2). 
The second simulation sets incentive rates using pre-2008 farmer water use and 
results from the first simulation. It calculates the water savings of each policy using 
post-2008 average water use. As table 7.10 shows, the per acre incentive policy that 
remains constant over the entire period leads to an average total savings of 15,964 
AF, at an average cost of $1,632 per AF saved. Next, a per acre rollout policy, the 
synthetic CREP policy, has an expected savings of 18,040 AF, at a cost of $1,626 per 
AF saved. Next are policies that set incentives based on pre-2008 water use. The 
constant and rollout per AF policies have substantially lower costs per AF saved, at 
$1465 and $1455 per AF saved, respectively. Finally, the costs per AF saved of each 
of these policies (constant and rollout) are even lower than the per AF policies. 
Next the absolute cost-effectiveness is calculated for each policy using the 
cost per unit saved of the optimal policy for a given level of water savings. For 
example, the per acre policy results in a water savings of 15,964 AF. Taking the 
integral under the supply curve of water savings from simulation 3 (figure 7.6), the 
total cost of the perfect foresight policy for a savings of 15,964 AF is about $13.7 
million. Thus the optimal policy has a cost of $856 per AF saved at that level of water 





$1,632/$856=1.91. The last row of table 7.10 provides results for the real CREP 
policy. In lieu of actual post-2008 water use, the savings from the real CREP policy 
are calculated using the coefficient of water savings once irrigation ceases entirely 
given in table 7.4. Table 7.10 suggests that the cost per AF saved of the real CREP 
policy is $1,144 per AF. This value should not be used to compare the cost-
effectiveness of CREP with simulated policies, as the estimates come from different 
samples of different sizes. However, the low value suggests that the designers of 
CREP chose a policy region with a large amount of marginal land and thus more plots 
likely to enroll at lower incentive rates. Further, it suggests that applying a similar 
policy to another region is likely to be more expensive for a given amount of water 
savings.  
Table 7.11 provides results from simulation 3 for a range of incentive rates. 
The values in the first column represent the incentive rates paid for each AF of 
average post-2008 water use. Using data from 100 simulation runs at each incentive 
rate, table 7.11 also provides means and standard deviations of total rights enrolled, 
total AF of water use saved, and the cost per AF of water saved. Because incentive 
rates in the first simulation are based on actual future water savings, the mean value 
of costs per AF saved are identical to incentive rates. As seen in the table, as incentive 
rates increase, the number of rights enrolled and amount of water savings both 
increase. This relationship is a direct result of the positive coefficient for incentives in 
the estimated probit model. The data from these simulations are then used to estimate 
an inverse supply curve as specified in equation 6.12. The results of the regression are 





7.6. As water savings increase, the required incentive rate increases at a decreasing 
rate. This curve is used to assess the total cost of a perfect targeting policy. The total 
cost is calculated by taking the integral under the inverse supply curve for a given 
level of water savings. Figure 7.6 also depicts a step function to show how payments 
made in the simulations compare to the estimated supply curve. If the estimated 
supply curve depicted in the figure represents the true supply curve, farmers with a 
given value for their water rights will be overpaid by the amount represented by the 
vertical distance from the step function to the supply curve.  
The results of the policy simulations suggest two main findings. First, policies 
that set incentives based on prior water use outperform policies that pay rates based 
on acreage retired. The per AF policies have absolute cost-effectiveness ratings 
ranging from 1.53 to 1.66 times the costs of the optimal policy, compared to a range 
of 1.8 to 1.91 for per acre policies. Second, policies that increase rates over time 
perform better than policies that keep the rates offered constant over time. This result 
is due to the ability of rollout policies to capture unobserved differences in farmers’ 
willingness to accept to retire their water rights. The UAR CREP has been using this 
approach. Although CREP has shown a high level of water savings for those that 
have enrolled, policy makers that would like to more efficiently reduce water savings 
may consider incentives based on prior water use. However, it should be noted that 










































Incentives ($ per 


































500 12.51 4.12 3,932.63 1,832.88 500.00 0.00 154,610.80 45,987.53 
600 14.77 4.53 4,731.29 1,950.26 600.00 0.00 190,681.41 47,288.86 
700 17.46 4.89 5,724.66 2,078.90 700.00 0.00 228,194.91 49,512.23 
800 20.49 5.15 6,818.61 2,216.86 800.00 0.00 265,282.75 52,791.81 
900 24.11 5.11 8,094.91 2,303.12 900.00 0.00 301,216.38 52,420.48 
1000 28.87 5.74 9,818.99 2,496.02 1,000.00 0.00 339,792.09 50,479.60 
1100 34.02 6.51 11,649.49 2,867.00 1,100.00 0.00 375,584.22 49,026.77 
1200 39.99 7.08 13,823.32 3,164.72 1,200.00 0.00 414,094.44 50,276.38 
1300 46.71 7.94 16,207.32 3,490.53 1,300.00 0.00 450,587.53 51,589.88 





Table 7.12: Regression of Cost per AF Saved on Total Water Savings 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES OLS SE 
   
Total Use Saved (in 1000 AF) 80.48*** (2.696) 
Total Use Saved Squared -1.501*** (0.107) 
Constant 341.2*** (14.71) 
   
Observations 1,000  
R-squared 0.782  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 






















7.3. Policy Discussion 
The following section discusses the relevance of the above results for larger scale 
policies. First, I discuss the role of spatial externalities in the effectiveness of water 
rights retirement programs. Second, I discuss the potential issue of anticipation 
effects in the context of the increasing rates mechanism discussed in the analysis. 
Finally, I discuss how the policy instruments analyzed above relate to other 
mechanisms discussed in the literature. 
Because aquifers are shared resources, one might be concerned that if CREP 
impacts depletion rates in the aquifer, this could have some second order effects on 
nearby farmers’ water use. One concern is that if such externalities exist, they could 
affect the value of the estimates in this paper of the impact of CREP on water use. 
Specifically, if enrollments in CREP decrease depletion for control farmers included 
in the fixed effects regression, this could impact their water use and thus the 
estimated coefficient. Because the current program is small and very few control 
farms in the regression are close to CREP enrollees, the effect on the regression 
coefficient will be negligible. 
However, even if this coefficient is estimated correctly, externalities could 
have more general implications for the effectiveness of water rights retirement 
programs. If some water rights are removed from the pool of water appropriations, 
reduced depletion rates for nearby farmers could impact their perception of the 
relative impact of their own water use on depletion. These farmers may be more 
inclined to conserve water over time, considering the opportunity costs of future uses 





impact groundwater use. For example, Pfeiffer and Lin (2012) find that the average 
farmer in Western Kansas would decrease his water use by 2.5% annually if all 
surrounding farmers were to suddenly stop irrigating. However, estimates of the 
water use impacts and welfare benefits from groundwater management vary greatly in 
the literature (Koundouri 2004). 
Alternatively, reduced depletion due to a rights retirement program may 
increase surrounding farmers’ water use, due to decreases in their total energy costs. 
Pfeiffer and Lin (2014b) find that the elasticity of farmer water use to energy prices in 
Kansas is -0.26. Further, Pfeiffer and Lin (2012) find that depletion of a particular 
well would decrease by about 0.3% of the mean depth to groundwater per year if all 
surrounding farmers within a mile stopped using water, increasing energy costs by 
this much each year. Combining these values together, if all farmers enrolled in 
CREP, after ten years of the program the decreased energy costs due to cumulative 
reduced depletion would still only increase farmer water use by less than 1%. 
A second concern about the policy implications of this analysis has to do with 
the anticipation effects discussed earlier related to the increasing incentive rates 
mechanism. In chapter 6, I argue that anticipation effects will be minimal for a small 
program such as CREP. However, for a bigger program, anticipation effects may be a 
more serious issue. In particular, anticipation effects may occur if potential 
participants are confident in their ability to enroll in a later period when rates are 
increased. Of those farmers who would profit from enrolling today, those most likely 





This is because the relative gain from a delay in enrollment is much higher when the 
gain from enrolling today is minimal.  
Figure 7.7 below shows how anticipation effects might impact the cost 
effectiveness of a rate increase mechanism. Suppose a program pays incentives based 
on past water use and plans to increase offered incentive rates twice over a certain 
time span until a savings goal or budget cap is reached.8 If the program lasts the 
entire time span, the rates will be increased from 𝑃𝑃1 to 𝑃𝑃2 to 𝑃𝑃3 over time. If the 
program manager is able to set incentive rates based on expected savings as above, he 
could presumably set the price at 𝑃𝑃3 from the beginning and obtain his savings goal. 
In this case, he would be overpaying for these savings by the area below the solid line 
at 𝑃𝑃1 and above the supply curve. However, if he increases offered incentive rates 
over time, the program could be more cost effective. If there were no anticipation 
effects, as assumed in the analysis above, he would only overpay by the amount 
below the solid step function and above the supply curve. However, if there were 
anticipation effects, more farmers would receive a higher rate, and the manager would 
overpay by the area below the dashed step function. As the program goal or budget 
cap becomes closer to being met and the risk of the program ending increases, 
farmers are less likely to delay their decisions. Thus, the set of farmers who delay will 
be larger in the first round. As depicted in the figure, farmers delay for at most one 
period. However, as incentives drive more farmers to delay, the dashed lines will 
move to the left. In the extreme case, all farmers will delay two periods, and a 
program with increasing rates will cost the same amount as a policy that offers 
                                                 





𝑃𝑃3 from the beginning. Thus, unless there are severe anticipation effects for a 
program, a program rollout strategy is likely to bring cost savings over a fixed price. 
Further, cost effectiveness of programs can be improved by ensuring that there is a 
risk that farmers will lose their chance to enroll by delaying their enrollment 
decisions.
 
Figure 7.7: Cost savings from increasing rates, with and without anticipation 
effects 
 
Finally, we consider how the mechanisms analyzed in this paper compare to 
other mechanisms in the literature. In particular, one feature of the current CREP, 
increasing incentive rates over time, can help to capture unobserved differences in 





than the mechanisms discussed in this analysis. However, the mechanisms discussed 
in this paper are actually more similar to common auction designs than they might 
appear. For example, uniform priced auctions pay a fixed price set at the maximum 
bid of all bidders below a certain bid cap, given some budget constraint or benefits 
goal. Uniform priced auctions are particularly useful for setting an appropriate price 
when the distribution of prices is unknown (Latacz-Lohmann and Schilizzi 2005). 
However, if incentive rates can be set based on supply curves based on empirical 
enrollment data as they are in this paper, then this is unnecessary. If such data is 
available, either a uniform priced auction or a constant rate policy could enroll similar 
sets of individuals at a similar total cost. Discriminant auctions, which pay bidders 
their exact bids, have more potential to improve cost effectiveness (Latacz-Lohmann 
and Schilizzi 2005). Discriminant auctions and the increasing rate policy discussed in 
this paper both aim to limit information rents by tracing out the true supply curve. In 
discriminant auctions, if bidders are fairly certain of how much the maximum rate 
they can bid is, they will general shade their bids (Latacz-Lohmann and Van der 
Hamsvoort 1997). This is fairly similar to the problem of anticipation effects with the 
rate increase policy. If farmers are fully aware of the maximum time they can wait for 
a rollout policy, one may similarly expect anticipation effects. Thus, bid shading and 
anticipation effects are situations that are likely to be impacted by similar factors.  
Still, there may be some important tradeoffs between auctions and the 
increasing rate mechanism discussed in this paper. Particularly for large programs, 
increasing rates over time may be an inefficient approach, requiring that the program 





costs of implementation and the benefits will be discounted. On the other hand, 
auctions place a higher cost of participation on sellers than fixed price mechanisms. 
People may also take a bit of time to make their enrollment decisions, and decisions 
may be influenced by factors that change from year to year. Auctions that require that 
people make bids immediately may further deter participation. Further, auctions can 
also be perceived as less transparent and fair to potential sellers (Lundberg 2018). If 
for these reasons auctions deter participation of low cost farmers from enrolling, this 
could increase the costs of savings relative to fixed prices mechanisms. Such impacts 
on participation can be large. For example, DePiper (2015) finds that for fishing 
license buybacks for crab fishermen in Maryland, fewer than half of sellers who sold 
their licenses under a fixed price mechanism would have participated in an auction. 
Thus the rollout mechanism discussed in this paper may provide a more feasible 
approach to improving the cost-effectiveness of conservation programs. For a small 
program like the current UAR CREP that focuses mostly on enrolling low quality 
land, the issues with auctions may outweigh the issues with an increasing rate 
mechanism. However, for a bigger scale program targeting higher quality land, 
program implementation time could be a more serious concern. Further research may 

















Chapter 8: Conclusions 
 
This study examines the extent to which an existing water rights retirement program 
impacts farmer water use and determines what kinds of incentive rates are most cost-
effective at saving water. Using fixed effects models with matched samples, it finds 
that CREP saves a high amount of water use relative to the total amount of authorized 
use it retires. The program effectively attracts high water use individuals, and at least 
in the near term, does not attract individuals with lower future water use. Further, the 
study evaluates cost-effectiveness of various water rights retirement incentive 
schemes and finds that a policy design similar to the UAR CREP, applied to an 
outside region, has a cost per AF saved of 1.8 times that of a perfect targeting policy. 
Policies that pay incentives based on prior water use and that increase rates over time 
are more cost effective, with costs per AF saved of 1.53-1.55 times that of a perfect 
targeting policy. 
 The results of this study contribute to our knowledge of the impacts of 
policies aimed at reducing farmer water use. In particular, this is the first study to 
empirically examine the extent to which water rights retirement programs reduce 
water use. The results suggest that CREP effectively reduces water use by targeting 
high water use individuals. The high savings attributable to CREP stand in contrast 
with the negligible water savings of past policies such as cost-sharing incentives for 
efficient irrigation systems. The large conservation impact of CREP also contrasts 
with the impacts of other incentive-based conservation policies in general. The large 





correlation between water use intensity and the value of water rights. This study also 
contributes to the literature evaluating the cost effectiveness of incentive-based 
conservation policies. Incentive-based policies such as CREP that increase rates over 
time are more cost-effective than those that do not. Such policies attract farmers with 
the lowest value of water first, thus are able to target based on unobserved differences 
in value. The results also suggest that incentives that target individuals based on data 
of past water use can be considerably more cost-effective at achieving water savings.  
This study’s findings have implications for policy makers in water-scarce 
regions looking to more efficiently manage water. The findings suggest that policy 
makers can target high-use irrigators in future efforts to reduce stress on water 
supplies and can at the same time encourage conservation of the least profitable 
irrigated farmland. It also finds that the current CREP design can be made more cost-
effective with some simple changes to the program’s incentive designs. The study 
finds that the current policy’s practice of increasing the incentive rates offered over 
time captures unobserved differences in the value of water rights. Consequently, 
water managers can use this as an alternative to mechanisms such as auctions as a 
way to decrease the costs of achieving conservation goals. The simulations also 
suggest that per-use incentive rates are a potential alternative way to target high-use 
irrigators. Current eligibility requirements ensure that farmers only enroll intensely 
irrigated land, but per-use incentives could achieve the same goal by simply paying 
lower rates to farmers who use little water. Thus future policies could increase the 






There are a few notable caveats to the findings of this study. First, although it 
has achieved high water use savings from enrolled rights, CREP has only succeeded 
in enrolling 145 marginal water rights so far. To make a more substantial impact on 
aquifer depletion, many more rights will need to be enrolled. Water managers can 
gradually increase the scope of retirement programs by offering higher incentive rates 
over time. However, without more insight into the willingness to accept of unenrolled 
farmers to retire their rights, it would be difficult to determine if water rights 
retirement programs could actually be a cost effective approach to substantially slow 
down aquifer depletion. Further, although CREP reduces annual water use over the 
ten policy years observed, this study is unable to look at the full policy horizon to 
measure the total water savings of the program. Future research examining the long-
term implications of water rights retirements on patterns of aquifer depletion would 
be interesting. Finally, future work should compare the relative merits of the 
mechanisms explored in this analysis such as policy rollouts to other policy 
approaches such as auctions in achieving the most cost-effective water savings. Such 
work would benefit from a more complete distribution of water rights values and a 
more detailed analysis of the role of anticipation of rate increases for policies that 
increase rates over time. Despite these limitations, the results of this study provide 
strong empirical evidence that water rights retirement programs offer a promising 









Chapter 9: Household Willingness to Pay for Stream 
Restoration on Public and Private Land: Evidence from the 
Baltimore Metropolitan Region 
9.1. Introduction 
Rivers and streams are vital assets that provide a range of ecosystem services and 
goods, such as drinking water, recreational opportunities, and aquatic habitat. Stream 
restoration has emerged as one of the most widely used interventions to improve 
water quality with over 37,000 stream restoration projects in the United States during 
1990-2003 at an estimated total cost of $15 billion (Bernhardt et al. 2005). Streams 
and their degradation obey no boundaries for land tenure, such that in many urban 
and suburban areas, the majority of stream miles occur on privately owned land. Our 
analysis focuses on the Baltimore region where the majority of stream restoration 
projects have been undertaken on public land, despite the fact that over 80% of the 
total stream miles are located on private property. In order to comply with the total 
maximum daily load (TMDL) requirements under the Clean Water Act, there is a 
growing need to increase restoration activity on private property, as well as continued 
restoration on public lands. Yet there is limited research on household willingness to 
pay (WTP) for costly stream restoration efforts in urbanized regions that may occur 
on both private and public land. 
Using the stated preference approach, the literature has analyzed the impact of 
allowing access on public lands. Johnston and Duke (2007), for instance, use a choice 





allowing public access significantly increases household value particularly for 
walking and biking activities. Kline and Wichelns (1998) find that public access can 
impact the value of preserving some land use types, but not others. Johnston et al. 
(2005) find that resource users value certain types of access to restoration sites more 
than nonusers. McGonagle and Swallow (2005) analyze how different levels of public 
access may impact the WTP for the amenities at coastal preservation sites, varying 
the number of parking spaces at public beaches. They find that households have 
heterogeneous WTP for public access based on different attitudes for environmental 
goals and recreational activities, and that high levels of access may actually reduce 
the willingness to pay of coastal preservation for some individuals living in close 
proximity to public beaches.  
Another important factor is proximity to the resource. Several studies have 
estimated how distance to a restoration or preservation site affects its values 
(Bateman et al. 2006; Brouwer, Martin-Ortega and Berbel 2010; Schaafsma, Brouwer 
and Rose 2012; Jorgensen et al. 2013). Some papers have analyzed the dissipation in 
WTP over distance, hereafter referred to as distance decay. Others have examined 
heterogeneity in distance decay in overall willingness to pay for preserving resources 
for users and nonusers (Sutherland and Walsh 1985; Schaafsma, Brouwer and Rose 
2012; Jorgensen et al. 2013). This study is the first to estimate the heterogeneity in 
distance decay across different types of land ownership of the resource. 
In this study, we examine household preferences for stream restoration on 
private and public land using a choice experiment to elicit the WTP for stream 





with a hypothetical stream location being considered for restoration, where land 
ownership and distance to the stream location vary across choice experiments. The 
restoration designs include four types of attributes, including near-stream vegetation 
type in the riparian zone, streambank stabilization and structure, nutrient pollution 
reduction in local streams and the Chesapeake Bay, and the cost to the household. 
Using several modeling specifications, we estimate the WTP for these restoration 
attributes and examine the variation in these estimates by land ownership and 
distance.  
This study makes two main contributions to the literature. First, it identifies 
which attributes of stream restoration convey value. The restoration attributes of 
streambank stabilization and nutrient reduction each have a positive and highly 
significant WTP for all six combinations of land ownership and distance. Households 
have a one-time marginal WTP for the protection of streambanks using boulders and 
wetlands ranging from $87.55-153.96 and $82.00-138.47, respectively. Households 
also have a significant WTP for reducing water pollution in all six situations. On the 
other hand, changes in near-stream vegetation attributes only have a significant WTP 
in a few cases. Most notably, the removal of existing trees actually has a significant 
negative WTP when within walking distance and on private land. Policy makers can 
use these results to set priorities for choosing which kinds of alterations to make in 
future restoration projects. 
Second, we examine heterogeneity in WTP for restoration projects across 
several levels of both land ownership and distance. Previous studies have analyzed 





examined heterogeneity in the WTP of attributes based on land ownership. This 
distinction is important because the opportunities for restoration projects on public 
land are limited and future restoration projects will need to be increasingly 
implemented on privately owned land. For the addition of boulders, WTP is $59.62 
greater on public than private land when within far driving distance. The differences 
between public and private for boulders and wetland are insignificant when within 
walking distance. Further, previous studies have explored the role of distance to a 
resource in evaluating its value but have not examined heterogeneity in WTP based 
on land ownership and distance. It is often thought that WTP dissipates with distance 
mainly because of the ease of visiting a site (Bateman et al. 2006). However, our 
findings suggest that distance decay may sometimes be driven more by nonuse 
considerations. For instance, on private land we find that WTP for streambank 
stabilization attributes is significantly greater when comparing streams within 
walking and driving distance. However, there is no significant distance decay for 
these same attributes when on public land. In general, our findings suggest that policy 
makers would benefit from knowledge of heterogeneity in WTP when deciding 
whether to restore streams on private land, or in less densely populated areas where 
the local amenity benefits may be relatively small.  
 
9.2. Policy Background on Stream Restoration 
Urban development has led to major increases in sediment and pollution loads 
entering streams and local waterways. Impervious surfaces, such as roads and 





flows after heavy rainfall. This puts stress on streams, increasing soil erosion and 
damaging public infrastructure such as sewer pipes, roads, and bridges. Higher 
amounts of nutrient pollution in local waterways leads to excessive growth of algae 
that can negatively affect fish and other aquatic organisms. The Clean Water Act of 
1972 regulates discharges from point sources (e.g., wastewater treatment plants), 
whereas urban stormwater was initially exempt because it was considered a nonpoint 
source. This changed in 1987 when the United States Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) established the National Pollution Discharge Elimination System 
(NPDES) stormwater program that required large municipal separate storm sewer 
systems (MS4s) located in incorporated areas with populations of 100,000 or more to 
comply with NPDES permits to mitigate the impacts of urban stormwater.  
Over the past few decades, efforts to restore the Chesapeake Bay have 
achieved limited success in improving water quality. Urban development and the 
associated stormwater runoff in the Bay watershed has been a major contributor of 
excess nutrient and sediment loads. In 2010, the EPA established the Chesapeake Bay 
TMDL that set pollution reduction requirements for nitrogen, phosphorus and 
sediment that must be achieved by 2025. The Bay TMDL is the largest ever 
developed by the EPA, spanning across portions of six states (Maryland, 
Pennsylvania, Virginia, Delaware, New York, West Virginia plus the District of 
Columbia). Urban stormwater management is the most costly sector. The estimated 
total cost of complying with the TMDL is $14.4 billion in Maryland alone, with $7.3 
billion in expected compliance costs to adopt practices in the urban stormwater 





primarily addressed by local governments, who each are required to develop their 
own watershed implementation plan (WIP) for meeting reduction for their load 
allocations. 
Stream restoration is one of the main approaches used by local governments in 
the City of Baltimore and Baltimore County to comply with the TMDL. Stream 
restoration projects absorb nutrients and also are often designed with bank stabilizing 
features (e.g., boulders, stones) to reduce erosion and potential damage to 
infrastructure, such as sewer pipes, roads and bridges. Stream restorations can provide 
aesthetic benefits to communities using vegetation management in the riparian zone, 
such as tree planting and other features. Baltimore County’s WIP states that stream 
restoration is the most important approach being implemented for meeting long-term 
nutrient reduction goals, with the proposed plan to expand from 63,174 linear feet in 
2013 to 347,000 linear feet by 2025 (MDE 2012b). Stream restoration projects in this 
region cost approximately $500-1200 per linear foot (Kenney et al. 2012), meaning 
that Baltimore County plans to spend about $141-340 million on stream restorations 
alone over this period.  
  Figure 9.1 shows the 58 stream restoration projects that have already been 
implemented in Baltimore County and Baltimore City. The majority of these projects 
have occurred in suburban areas that are located within the municipal sewer service 
area. Baltimore County has an urban growth boundary, also known as the Urban-
Rural Demarcation Line (URDL), which restricts the extension of sewer service to 
occur within the URDL. Residential development at higher density (> 1 house per 





density (< 1 house per acre) is commonly built on septic systems in the rural area 
outside the URDL (Newburn and Ferris 2016). Although the area inside the URDL 
only comprises approximately one-third of Baltimore County’s total land area, it 
contains the vast majority of the county population. Consequently, stream restoration 
projects mainly occur inside the URDL in Baltimore County, due to higher density 
and hence more impervious surfaces, where streams are more likely to be degraded.  
 






Fewer projects have been completed in Baltimore City. The city is completely 
within the URDL, and urban development occurs primarily at very high density. In 
fact, the majority of the land area in Baltimore City was built historically at such high 
urban density that most streams have been buried and flow underground in large 
stormwater pipes. The small number of restoration projects mainly occur in the 
outskirts of Baltimore City, where streams are more common, and density is 
relatively lower. The rural region outside the URDL in Baltimore County also has 
fewer restoration projects than inside the URDL. Exurban development outside the 
URDL occurs at lower density such that streams are typically less degraded and are 
lower priority for restoration. Nonetheless, there is interest in restoration projects 
outside the URDL because residential development on septic systems have a higher 
nitrogen load per household.  
Figure 9.1 also shows the distribution of streams on public and private lands. 
Public land includes parks, schools and other publicly owned properties for Baltimore 
County and Baltimore City, based on the parcel-level tax assessment data from the 
Maryland Department of Planning. The stream layer shown in Figure 9.1 includes 
perennial and intermittent streams and rivers from the United States Geological 
Survey’s National Hydrography Dataset (NHD). Many existing stream restorations 
have occurred at least partially on public land due to easier access for construction. 
However, the majority of stream miles in Baltimore County and Baltimore City occur 
on private land. The total stream miles occurring on private land is 82% within the 
URDL in Baltimore County, 84.4% outside of the URDL, and 60.4% in Baltimore 





with the TMDL requirements and need to understand the relative WTP for restoration 
activities on public and private lands.  
 
9.3. Econometric Model  
In this section, we first outline the three econometric approaches used to estimate our 
choice model. These include a conditional logit model, a weighted conditional logit 
model, and a mixed logit model. We then provide a formulation that translates 
estimated parameters from the econometric models into marginal WTP estimates of 
stream restoration attributes. This formulation allows us to examine the heterogeneity 
in the marginal WTP for restoration attributes that potentially vary by land ownership 
and proximity to households. 
Choice experiments are theoretically grounded in a random utility modeling 
framework, where underlying a discrete choice model is an indirect utility function as 
in equation 9.1. The utility of a household 𝑈𝑈𝑗𝑗 derived from choice 𝑗𝑗 is the sum of a 
deterministic component 𝑉𝑉(𝑧𝑧𝑗𝑗 , 𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗) and a random component observed by the 
household but not the researcher 𝑒𝑒𝑗𝑗. The deterministic component is a function of a 
vector of attributes 𝑧𝑧𝑗𝑗 and a cost to the household 𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗. Because income is constant 
across choices, we do not include income in the specification of 𝑈𝑈𝑗𝑗 (Haab and 
McConnell 2002). Most studies specify a linear form for the deterministic portion of 
utility 
(9.1)    𝑈𝑈𝑗𝑗 = 𝑉𝑉�𝑧𝑧𝑗𝑗 , 𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗� + 𝑒𝑒𝑗𝑗 = 𝑧𝑧𝑗𝑗′𝛽𝛽 + 𝜆𝜆𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗 + 𝑒𝑒𝑗𝑗 . 
To estimate a random utility model, as shown in equation 9.1, a conditional logit (CL) 





Conditional logit models assume that the error term in equation 9.1 is independently 
and identically distributed (IID) according to a type I extreme value distribution 
(Train 2009).  
Our second econometric approach, a weighted conditional logit (WCL) 
model, allows us to account for non-response bias based on observable characteristics 
of sample respondents and non-respondents. Specifically, the WCL is an inverse 
probability weighting approach, outlined in detail in Hindsley, Landry and Gentner 
(2011). A probit model is used to estimate the probability that household 𝑖𝑖 in our 
sample participates in the survey as a function of observable characteristics 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 for 
respondents and non-respondents. In our case, we use observable parcel-level housing 
characteristics from the tax assessor database, surrounding land-use characteristics in 
the vicinity of each household, and neighborhood-level demographics from census 
data for both respondents and non-respondents in the sample. The predicted 
probability of household 𝑖𝑖 participating in the survey given the parcel-level and 
census tract-level characteristics 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖, is given by 𝜋𝜋�(𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖). Predicted probabilities for each 
respondent are then used in the weighted conditional logit model, where the weights 
are given by equation 9.2   




As the probability of responding increases, the weight 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖 decreases, meaning that 
households who are most likely to respond have lower weight in the regression 
analysis. 
  Our third econometric approach is a mixed logit (ML) model, also known as 





9.1 implies that the probabilities for decisions are mutually exclusive after controlling 
for observed covariates. This is known as the independence of irrelevant alternatives 
(IIA) assumption. The mixed logit model relaxes the IIA assumption to some degree, 
allowing for some correlation across choices for a given household. It adds a random 
component to the coefficients of observable covariates, fit to a specified probability 
distribution. The mixed logit model is a commonly used model for choice 
experiments (Johnston et al. 2005; Brouwer, Martin-Ortega and Berbel 2010; 
Londoño-Cadavid and Ando 2013), where it is often assumed that taste parameters 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 
are normally distributed with mean 𝑏𝑏 and standard deviations given by the diagonal 
matrix 𝑊𝑊 (Train 2009). This formulation is desirable when there is considerable 
heterogeneity in tastes for some attributes, in which case any alternatives with similar 
attribute levels will have correlated random components.  
Each of the three models outlined above are estimated using the specification 
in equation 9.3. In equation 9.3, 𝑈𝑈𝑗𝑗 is the utility received from a particular stream 
restoration option 𝑗𝑗. In our choice experiment, 𝑧𝑧𝑗𝑗 contains two types of attributes. 
First are restoration attributes, which vary across restoration options. These are given 
by the vector 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗, which includes attribute levels for near-stream vegetation type, 
streambank stabilization, and nutrient pollution reduction. Second are stream location 
attributes, which do not vary across restoration options and thus only enter equation 
9.3 as interaction terms. These include land ownership and stream proximity, which 
are considered as being fixed for any particular stream location. A dummy variable 
for land ownership 𝑎𝑎 takes the value one when the stream is on public land and zero 





stream location is within a short drive or far drive, respectively, from the household. 
When both 𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠 = 0 and 𝑑𝑑𝑓𝑓 = 0, the stream is within walking distance. Interactions are 
included between restoration attributes and stream location attributes to allow for 
heterogeneity in tastes based on different combinations of land ownership and 
proximity. Three-way interactions between land ownership, distance and restoration 
attributes allow for further heterogeneity, explained in more detail below. The cost to 
the household and error terms are defined as before in equation 9.1 
(9.3)    𝑈𝑈𝑗𝑗 = 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗′𝜃𝜃 + 𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗′𝛼𝛼 + 𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗′𝛿𝛿𝑠𝑠 + 𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗′𝛾𝛾𝑠𝑠 + 𝑑𝑑𝑓𝑓𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗′𝛿𝛿𝑓𝑓 + 𝑑𝑑𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗′𝛾𝛾𝑓𝑓 + 𝛾𝛾𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗 + 𝑒𝑒𝑗𝑗. 
Parameters are more interpretable when transformed into WTP estimates. 
Based on the results from Hanemann (1984), equation 9.4 provides the formula used 
in this study to determine the expected marginal WTP for a change in restoration 
attribute 𝑘𝑘. This can be calculated as the marginal rate of substitution between the 
attribute and household cost. It assumes that −𝜆𝜆 represents the marginal utility of 
income due to the cost to the household. Thus, the formula for marginal WTP 
represents the amount of income a household would willingly give up to pay for a 
marginal change in attribute 𝑘𝑘 







 .  
We are interested in how the marginal WTP of each restoration attribute 
differs based on land ownership and proximity to the household. This translates into 
two categories of hypotheses to test. The first is whether the marginal WTP for a 





other attributes. The second is whether the marginal WTP for a restoration attribute 
differs with distance, conditional on the land ownership and other attributes.  
First, consider an example of a hypothesis test for the difference between 
public and private land, conditional on proximity. If a household is within walking 
distance to a stream restoration on publicly owned land, the marginal WTP for 
restoration attribute 𝑘𝑘 is equal to −𝜃𝜃𝑗𝑗+𝑎𝑎𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗
𝜆𝜆
 If a household is within walking distance 
to a stream being restored on private land, the marginal WTP for this attribute is −𝜃𝜃𝑗𝑗
𝜆𝜆
. 
The difference between these two terms on public and private land is then −𝑎𝑎𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗
𝜆𝜆
, 
which can be viewed as the “public premium” for attribute 𝑘𝑘 for a stream within 
walking distance. A similar calculation based on equation 9.4 can also be used to 
determine the public premium for a stream within a short or far drive.  
The estimated public premium for attribute k  is more likely to be significant 
for some distances than for others, depending on how households care about land 
ownership. One reason for a public premium could be that public land allows for site 
visitation, while private land does not. If a site is far away, the residents are less likely 
to visit a stream on either public or private land. In this case, site visitation will lead 
to a public premium that is largest when within walking distance. On the other hand, 
residents may value restoration for any public or private locations in their 
neighborhood; however, at farther distances, they only value restoration on public 
lands in the region. This would suggest that they will have similar WTP for public 
and private sites in their neighborhood, but will have a public premium for restoration 





Second, consider how the marginal WTP for restoration attribute 𝑘𝑘 may vary 
with proximity, conditional on land ownership. Again, if a household is within 
walking distance of a stream being restored on public land, the marginal WTP for 
restoration attribute 𝑘𝑘 is  −𝜃𝜃𝑗𝑗+𝑎𝑎𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗
𝜆𝜆
. If that same household is within short driving 
distance of a stream being restored on public land, the marginal WTP for restoration 
attribute 𝑘𝑘 is −𝜃𝜃𝑗𝑗+𝑎𝑎𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗+𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝛿𝛿𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗+𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝛾𝛾𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗
𝜆𝜆
. The difference between these terms is 
𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝛿𝛿𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗+𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝛾𝛾𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗
𝜆𝜆
, which can be viewed as the distance decay in WTP for attribute k  
between streams within walking distance versus a short drive, conditional on the 
stream being on public land. Similar calculations could be used to estimate distance 
decay, conditional on private land. 
The discussion provided above for a significant public premium may also 
explain the different patterns in distance decay by landownership type. Because site 
visitation is only allowed on public land, this mechanism would explain distance 
decay on public but not private land. Meanwhile, if residents value stream restoration 
similarly on both public and private land in their immediate neighborhood, but only 
maintain higher support for restoration on public land for streams that are further 
away, then distance decay may only occur on private land. The assessment of 
differences in WTP for stream restoration attributes by land ownership and distance is 
an empirical issue to be tested. In the next section, we provide details on our survey 
instrument for the choice experiment, followed by the empirical regression analysis 






9.4. Household Survey Design and Data 
9.4.1. Data  
The survey was conducted in the Baltimore metro region, including the two local 
jurisdictions of Baltimore County (pop. 831,128) and the City of Baltimore (pop. 
621,849). The Baltimore metro region is large and diverse, ranging from dense urban 
communities to rural residential areas. The TMDL requirements have led to large-
scale efforts to implement urban stormwater management strategies targeted at 
reducing nutrient and sediment loads.  
To construct the sample population, we limited the sampling region to 
neighborhoods where stream restoration projects are likely to be implemented in the 
Baltimore metro region. As noted above, the inner core of downtown Baltimore City 
mainly has very high density development where restoration projects are not suitable 
because most streams are buried in stormwater pipes. To screen out these 
neighborhoods, we overlaid the existing restoration projects in Figure 9.1 with the 
census tract boundaries for the Baltimore City and area inside the URDL for 
Baltimore County. We estimated a probit regression model at the census tract level, 
where the dependent variable is whether the census tract has a restoration project and 
is modeled as a function of population density, urban land cover, stream density and 
other variables. We screened out any census tract where the predicted probability of 
restoration is less than 1%, which occurred almost exclusively in the dense area of 
downtown Baltimore City and along major interstate highway corridors. For the rural 





smaller than five acres, which screens out the rural properties in agriculture, forestry, 
and other uses. 
The sample for the household survey was drawn from the population of 
single-family homeowners in Baltimore County and Baltimore City, using the 
complete parcel-level tax assessor database from the Maryland Department of 
Planning. After the screening process above, 9.0% of all households in the sample 
region were outside the URDL in Baltimore County, 67.7% inside the URDL in 
Baltimore County and 23.3% in Baltimore City. We stratified the sample to ensure a 
sufficient number of households in the rural area outside of the URDL in Baltimore 
County. Specifically, a stratified random sample of 11,000 single family residential 
homeowners was drawn from the three regions: outside the URDL in Baltimore 
County (25%), inside the URDL in Baltimore County (50%), and Baltimore City 
(25%), where sampling was done with known weights since we have the complete tax 
assessor database.  
The survey design was informed based on detailed discussions with policy 
makers and academic experts in stream restoration. We interviewed hydrologists, 
ecologists, engineers and government agency staff from Baltimore County and City to 
properly describe and present restoration design attributes and other questions based 
on recent restoration projects in the study region. We then pretested the survey 
extensively on local residents to improve the clarity and revise the questionnaire 
accordingly. The survey was administered in September and October 2017, using an 
address-based sampling approach (Johnston et al. 2017), where recruitment letters to 





parcel-level tax assessor database. The letters included instructions for completing the 
survey online on Qualtrics, and a follow-up reminder letter was mailed several weeks 
later. We also included a raffle for Amazon gift cards awarded to six randomly 
selected respondents to increase the response rate. Each respondent was assigned a 
unique identification code and password to login into the online survey. The unique 
code was matched to their street address, allowing us to know the household’s 
location for inclusion of geospatial data in the analysis. Recruitment letters also 
provided an email address and phone number to allow the household to arrange for 
the option to have a paper copy of the survey mailed to them. Of the 11,000 
households in the survey sample, we received 963 online responses and 54 surveys 
were completed by mail, a response rate of 9.2%. Most, but not all, respondents 
completed all four choice questions, leaving a total of 4,004 usable choice 
experiments. Three respondents were removed due to missing housing characteristics 
or census demographic data, leaving 3,992 choice experiments for the regression 
analysis.  
 
9.4.2. Survey Design  
The survey questionnaire initially provided background information on stream 
restorations. Respondents were shown photographs with descriptions to explain how 
urban development and impervious surfaces creates conditions for increased 
stormwater volume and velocity, leading to stream bank erosion, infrastructure 
damage, sewer leakage, and downstream water pollution. Respondents were then 





activities for local parks, streams, and the Chesapeake Bay. After a section describing 
the different attributes of stream restoration, the four separate choice experiment 
questions were presented to each respondent. Finally, the survey concluded with 
demographic questions.  
Each respondent received four choice experiment questions, relating to a 
hypothetical stream with one of six possible combinations of land ownership and 
proximity. Each choice question included two possible stream restoration options and 
a third option for choosing to remain in the current situation (i.e., no restoration). 
Figure 9.2 provides an example of one choice experiment question. The choice 
experiment describes the stream location attributes for the land ownership and 
proximity to the household, which are the same for all three restoration options for a 
given hypothetical stream location. The restoration attributes for the three options are 
provided, where the status quo option always has the same baseline attributes. 
Table 9.1 summarizes the stream location and restoration attributes and their 
levels. Stream location attributes describe the land ownership and proximity 
variables. For land ownership type, a stream can be on public or private land. 
Respondents were told that only public land is accessible, whereas restoration on 
private property does not allow access. Proximity of the hypothetical stream location 
was set as one of three levels— within walking distance (less than a mile), short 
driving distance (1-5 miles), or far driving distance (greater than 5 miles). Land 
ownership and distance attributes varied across but not within choice experiment 
questions. Each respondent was randomly given four of the six possible combinations 






Figure 9.2: Example choice question 
 
Restoration attributes include near-stream vegetation, streambank 
stabilization, stream and bay pollution reduced, and the one-time household cost. 
Other than the one-time household cost 𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗, these restoration attributes correspond to 
the vector 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗 in equation 9.3. Near-stream vegetation has mixed forest and meadow as 
the status quo for existing vegetation in the riparian buffer zone. Restoration options 
include forested (planting new trees), meadow (removing trees), and unchanged for 
maintaining vegetation as mixed forest and meadow. For streambank stabilization, the 





further erosion and potential infrastructure damage when left unprotected. Restoration 
options include two of the most common approaches to stabilize stream banks. 
Adding boulders and stones along a stream bank hardens and protects the stream 
banks from erosion and reduce stream migration that may damage roads, bridges and 
buried sewer lines that often run along streams. Wetlands provide wildlife habitat in 
addition to helping to mitigate erosion from excess stormflows.  
Table 9.1: Attributes and Levels of Choice Questions 
Restoration attribute Status quo levels Restoration project levels 
Near-stream vegetation  Forest and meadow mixed 
Forest and meadow mixed 
Meadow 
Forested 
Streambank stabilization No changes made 
No changes made 
Boulders and stones added 
Wetland added 
Stream and bay pollution 
reduced 
Meets 0 % of goal for 
water zone 
Meets 10 % of goal for water zone 
Meets 20 % of goal for water zone 
Meets 30 % of goal for water zone 
Meets 40 % of goal for water zone 
Meets 50 % of goal for water zone 
Meets 60 % of goal for water zone 
One-time cost to your 







Stream location attribute Levels 
Stream access 
Not publicly accessible (on someone’s private property) 
Publicly accessible (at a park, school, or along the road) 
Proximity to stream 
Walking distance (within 1 mile) 
Driving distance (1-5 miles) 






Finally, stream and bay pollution reduction is a metric capturing the extent to 
which the stream restoration is able to meet regional goals for satisfying TMDL 
allocations. Determining levels for pollution reduction used the following approach. 
In the survey, respondents were told that the county has to reduce its water pollution 
each year, and the total county goal is split into 12 similarly sized water zones. These 
water zones are the 8-digit hydrologic unit code (HUC) watersheds as classified by 
the United States Geological Survey (USGS) that are used in the county WIP. 
Pollution reduction levels were determined by considering estimated effects on 
nitrogen from restorations in the county WIP, and determining how much of the 
yearly goals this would meet. Because there is a large range of possible effects of 
restorations on water quality, this calculation was used simply to make sure the 
provided levels were in the appropriate range of values. By framing water quality 
improvements as part of an overall yearly county plan, local residents can have a 
better understanding of the restorations as they relate to water quality improvements 
in the Chesapeake Bay. This was partly an attempt to address the well-known 
embedding problem associated with valuations of different scales of environmental 
improvements (Kahneman and Knetsch 1992). 
Experimental design involves choosing which attributes to combine into 
alternatives and which combinations of alternatives to put into choice sets (or choice 
questions). We generated choice sets using a SAS Macro that uses a D-optimality 
criterion, as described in Kuhfeld (2005). It uses an algorithm that minimizes the 
variance of a conditional logit model where the parameters are all assumed to equal 





designs when enough choice sets are used (Lusk and Norwood 2005). To avoid 
restoration choices that did not involve any intervention, attributes were restricted so 
that for all restoration choices, at least one of near-stream vegetation and stream 
stabilization changed from their status quo levels. This process was used to generate 
36 unique choice sets. Each unique choice set was combined with one of the six 
combinations of land ownership and proximity to a stream to make 216 choice sets. 
These were then split into 54 blocks, where the four choice sets included in each 
block were ordered randomly. Using the randomizer tool in Qualtrics, blocks were 
then assigned randomly and evenly as respondents completed the survey.   
 
9.5. Results 
9.5.1. Sample Selection 
Before discussing the main results of the survey, it is important to assess whether 
there are systematic differences between the survey respondents and non-respondents 
in order to understand whether non-response bias may affect the regression analysis 
and WTP estimates. Table 9.2 provides the regression results for a probit model 
estimating the propensity to respond to the survey. We include three categories of 
observable characteristics available for non-respondents and respondents. First, we 
include parcel-level housing characteristics from the Maryland Department of 
Planning. Second, we include characteristics for the surrounding land use in the 
vicinity of each parcel in the sample. We calculate the proportion of surrounding 
forest, agriculture and highly developed land, respectively, within a mile buffer of 





to the closest stream to each household was determined in ArcGIS using the USGS 
NHD stream flowline layer. Distance to the closest public land to each household was 
also determined in ArcGIS using layers from the Maryland Department of Planning. 
Finally, demographic characteristics are included at the census tract level. There are 
49 sampled individuals, including three survey respondents, removed from this 
analysis in Table 9.2 due to missing information on housing characteristics or census 
demographic data.  
Table 9.2: Probit Model of Participation in Survey 
 (1) (2) 
Variables Coefficient Standard error 
Parcel-level housing characteristics   
Lot size (acres) 0.0229 0.0215 
House size (1000 sq ft) 0.0048 0.0249 
Structure qualitya   
 Good 0.1790*** 0.0479 
 Very good -0.0345 0.1728 
Year structure builtb   
 1950-1975 -0.0512 0.0453 
 1975-2000 -0.1560*** 0.0533 
 2000-present -0.1000 0.0760 
Surrounding land use/land cover   
Proportion forest within 1 mile of household 0.0581 0.1645 
Proportion agricultural within 1 mile of household 0.0658 0.1687 
Proportion highly developed within 1 mile of household -0.2138 0.1982 
Distance to public land (miles) -0.0771 0.0569 
Distance to stream (miles) 0.0740 0.1118 
Census tract-level demographics   
Head of household has bachelors proportion 0.3135** 0.1405 
Median household income ($1000) -0.0004 0.0007 
Not worked in past year proportion 0.1445 0.3477 
Head of household racial minority proportion -0.3597*** 0.0775 
Age of head of household -0.0050 0.0048 
Household size -0.0945 0.0775 
Constant -0.9013*** 0.3495 
   
Observations 10,951  
2Χ  173.7  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
a Default category for structure quality is poor 





Results from the probit regression shown in Table 9.2 suggest that some 
characteristics differ between respondents and non-respondents. For instance, 
households with high quality housing structures are more likely to respond; however, 
the housing structure size is not statistically significant. All variables on surrounding 
land uses in forest, agriculture and high urban development, as well as the distances 
to public land or streams, are not statistically significant for the probability of survey 
response. For the census-level demographic characteristics, households located in 
census tracts with a higher proportion of households with a bachelor’s degree are 
more likely to respond. Furthermore, there is a lower likelihood of response for those 
households in census tracts with a higher proportion of minority heads of household. 
The age of head of household and household size are not statistically significant at the 
census tract level. Median household income at the census tract level is not 
statistically significant. 
Due to these significant differences between the parcel-level housing 
characteristics and census-level demographic characteristics for respondents and non-
respondents, there is the potential for sample selection bias in the model estimation. 
For this reason, we estimate a WCL model to account for sample selection, based on 
the weights described in equation 9.2. While we are able to control for self-selection 
based on observable factors, as shown in Table 9.2, we should acknowledge that there 
may be unobserved factors that exist as well. This should be taken into account when 
interpreting the estimation results below, and the WCL model is mainly used to 






9.5.2. Estimation Results  
Table 9.3 shows the estimation results for the conditional logit model, weighted 
conditional logit model, and mixed logit model, based on the random utility model 
specification from equation 9.3. Tests of joint significance of all parameters are 
highly significant for all three models. Estimated coefficients for the CL and WCL 
models are provided in columns 1 and 3, respectively. The WCL model is preferred to 
the CL model because it reduces the potential non-response bias. For the ML model, 
the estimated coefficients for the mean and standard deviation parameters are 
provided in columns 5 and 7, respectively. While the most flexible ML model 
specification would allow for a random distribution for the entire vector of 
parameters, in practice this may lead to challenges for model convergence due to the 
large number of random parameters (Layton 2000; Hensher and Greene 2003). For 
this reason, the parameters for the five main restoration attributes, 𝜃𝜃 in equation 9.3, 
are specified to be random in the ML model, and all other parameters for the 25 
interaction terms with distance and land ownership are specified as fixed parameters. 
A Wald test of the joint significance of standard deviation parameters in the ML 
model shows that it provides a significantly better fit than the CL model. The ML 
model is preferred to the CL model since it allows for preference heterogeneity for 
households, as indicated by the significance in the estimated standard deviation 
parameters for the restoration attributes. Note that the estimated mean coefficients in 
Table 9.3 are scaled higher in the ML model as expected compared to the CL and 






Table 9.3: Results of Conditional Logit, Weighted Conditional Logit and Mixed 
Logit Models 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variables CL SE WCL SE ML-Coef SE ML-SD SE 
         
Meadow -0.387*** (0.124) -0.412*** (0.134) -0.669*** (0.211) -1.272*** (0.160) 
Forest -0.018 (0.113) -0.084 (0.124) 0.017 (0.176) 0.675*** (0.171) 
Boulders 1.305*** (0.125) 1.486*** (0.134) 2.200*** (0.214) 1.355*** (0.167) 
Wetland 1.153*** (0.123) 1.321*** (0.137) 2.004*** (0.197) 0.915*** (0.167) 
Nutrients 0.024*** (0.003) 0.024*** (0.003) 0.045*** (0.006) -0.060*** (0.004) 
Cost -0.010*** (0.001) -0.010*** (0.001) -0.018*** (0.002)   
Access X Meadow 0.376** (0.183) 0.505** (0.204) 0.642** (0.306)   
Access X Forest 0.127 (0.159) 0.287* (0.172) 0.154 (0.251)   
Access X Boulders 0.180 (0.174) 0.106 (0.183) 0.296 (0.284)   
Access X Wetland 0.200 (0.171) 0.112 (0.188) 0.233 (0.252)   
Access X Nutrients 0.002 (0.004) 0.001 (0.005) 0.006 (0.007)   
Short Drive X Meadow 0.487*** (0.172) 0.502*** (0.189) 0.937*** (0.292)   
Short Drive X Forest 0.182 (0.158) 0.182 (0.175) 0.461* (0.239)   
Short Drive X Boulders -0.196 (0.164) -0.365** (0.183) -0.367 (0.269)   
Short Drive X Wetland -0.124 (0.159) -0.279 (0.178) -0.290 (0.232)   
Short Drive X Nutrients -0.008* (0.004) -0.006 (0.005) -0.014* (0.007)   
Far Drive X Meadow 0.433** (0.179) 0.444** (0.195) 0.835*** (0.305)   
Far Drive X Forest 0.037 (0.161) 0.110 (0.178) 0.132 (0.250)   
Far Drive X Boulders -0.446*** (0.171) -0.581*** (0.186) -0.762*** (0.279)   
Far Drive X Wetland -0.301* (0.170) -0.472** (0.189) -0.515** (0.252)   
Far Drive X Nutrients -0.003 (0.004) -0.002 (0.004) -0.009 (0.007)   
Access X Short Drive X Meadow -0.256 (0.256) -0.491* (0.281) -0.500 (0.428)   
Access X Short Drive X Forest -0.013 (0.227) -0.091 (0.255) -0.108 (0.352)   
Access X Short Drive X Boulders 0.034 (0.234) 0.123 (0.253) 0.104 (0.389)   
Access X Short Drive X Wetland 0.081 (0.235) 0.177 (0.263) 0.264 (0.349)   
Access X Short Drive X Nutrients 0.012** (0.006) 0.009 (0.006) 0.021** (0.010)   
Access X Far Drive X Meadow -0.226 (0.264) -0.394 (0.295) -0.358 (0.440)   
Access X Far Drive X Forest 0.165 (0.237) -0.015 (0.264) 0.263 (0.373)   
Access X Far Drive X Boulders 0.377 (0.234) 0.511** (0.254) 0.736* (0.387)   
Access X Far Drive X Wetland 0.215 (0.234) 0.361 (0.260) 0.433 (0.347)   
Access X Far Drive X Nutrients 0.004 (0.006) 0.008 (0.007) 0.007 (0.010)   
         
Observations 11,976  11,976  11,976    
Wald test p-value (joint test)a 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the individual household 
level for each model. There are 3992 usable choice sets included in the regression, with three choices 
per choice set. 
a Wald tests are performed for joint significance of parameters. The test in column (7) tests the joint 





We use the estimation results in Table 9.3 to derive marginal WTP estimates 
for each attribute of stream restoration for the WCL model (Table 9.4) and ML model 
(Table 9.5) and CL model (Table 9.6), respectively. The marginal WTP estimates for 
each restoration attribute calculated based on equation 9.4, conditional on each of the 
possible combinations of land ownership and distance. The marginal WTP for 
nutrient reduction is the value of achieving a 1% reduction in nutrient pollution for 
the local water zone. The marginal WTP for the other restoration attributes represent 
a discrete change from the baseline status quo category, given that streambank 
stabilization and near-stream vegetation attributes are categorical variables. All 
standard errors are calculated using the delta method.  
We focus here on the WTP estimation results for the WCL model in Table 9.4 
in the discussion below. In Table 9.4, boulders and wetland have a significant positive 
marginal WTP regardless of land ownership and distance. This finding suggests that 
people have a high WTP for stabilizing eroded streams, even ones they will not likely 
visit. However, the range of values is considerable. The WTP for streambank 
stabilization by placement of boulders ranges from $87.55 to $153.96. The WTP for 
wetlands ranges from $82.00 to $138.47. The marginal WTP for nutrient reduction is 
also positive and highly significant for each combination of land ownership and 
proximity. This last result suggests that residents value water quality improvement in 
local streams and the Chesapeake Bay and have a strong preference to improve its 
water quality regardless of where the improvements are being made.  
On the other hand, meadow and forest are less likely to have a significant 





forests when on public land and within a short or far driving distance. However, these 
estimates are considerably smaller in economic significance compared to those for 
streambank stabilization and nutrient reduction. This likely has much to do with the 
status quo (and default) category for streamside vegetation. Apparently, people do not 
have strong preferences between a mixed landscape (the status quo), forest and 
meadow. Further, there is a significant negative WTP associated with meadow when 
on private land within walking distance. The negative marginal WTP suggests that 
meadows can be unpopular on private land since it involves removal of existing trees 
from the status quo on mixed forest and meadow.  
Table 9.4: Marginal WTP of Restoration Attributes for Weighted Conditional 
Logit Model 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Walk Short Drive Far Drive Walk - Short 
Drive 
Walk - Far 
Drive 
Boulders      
   Public 153.96*** 130.58*** 147.17*** 23.38 6.79 
   Private 143.71*** 108.40*** 87.55*** 35.31* 56.16*** 
   Public-Private 10.25 22.18 59.62***   
Wetland      
   Public 138.47*** 128.57*** 127.66*** 9.90 10.81 
   Private 127.68*** 100.70*** 82.00*** 26.98 45.68** 
   Public-Private 10.79 27.87 45.66**   
Nutrients      
   Public 2.36*** 2.67*** 2.95*** -0.31 -0.59 
   Private 2.30*** 1.73*** 2.12*** 0.57 0.18 
   Public-Private 0.06 0.94** 0.83*   
Forest      
   Public 19.64 28.41** 28.80** -8.77 -9.16 
   Private -8.10 9.50 2.54 -17.60 -10.65 
   Public-Private 27.75* 18.91 26.26   
Meadow      
   Public 9.04 10.06 13.93 -1.02 -4.89 
   Private -39.80*** 8.72 3.15 -48.52*** -42.95** 
   Public-Private 48.84** 1.33 10.78   
Observations 11976 11976 11976 11976 11976 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 






For boulders, Table 9.4 shows some important differences between WTP of 
restoration attributes on public and private land. Specifically, in Table 9.4, 
households have a $59.62 public premium for boulders when they are a far drive 
away, significant at the 1% level. If the primary reason for a public premium has to 
do with access, then the public premium should be highest when within walking 
distance. However, boulders only have a public premium when they are a far drive 
away from households. Table 9.4 also shows some significant differences in WTP 
across distances, conditional on land ownership. For boulders and wetland, there is a 
significant distance decay for restorations on private land but not on public land. For 
stream restorations on private land, households are willing to pay $35.31 and $56.16 
more for boulders when within walking distance compared to within a short drive and 
far drive, respectively. Further, households will pay $45.68 more for wetlands within 
walking distance versus far driving distance. The values for distance decay of both 
boulders and wetland are positive for restorations on public land, but never 
significant. Taken together, the results for public premiums and distance decay of 
stream appearance suggest that people value improvements to streams in their 
neighborhood regardless of land ownership, but care less about private streams 
outside of their neighborhood. 
   Land ownership and distance also have an important effect on the WTP for 
other restoration attributes. When within walking distance of a stream, households 
place a significant public premium on both meadows and forest. For the addition of 
trees, households will pay a $27.75 public premium for a stream within walking 





if it is part of a stream restoration on publicly owned land, a difference which is 
significant at the 5% level. This is driven by the significant negative marginal WTP 
for meadow on private land within walking distance. Further, there is a significant 
negative distance decay for meadows on private land. However, again this is driven 
by the negative WTP of meadow within walking distance. Finally, when within a 
short and far drive the public premiums for nutrient reduction are positive and 
significant at the 5% and 10% levels, respectively. However, there is no significant 
distance decay for nutrient reduction on public or private land. This is not that 
surprising as the value of nutrient reduction is largely non-local and would not be 
expected to exhibit significant distance decay. 
The WTP estimation results for the ML and CL model in Tables 9.5 and 9.6 
respectively are largely similar to those in Table 9.4, suggesting that the main results 
are robust to the different model specifications that account for non-response bias or 
individual heterogeneity. Results for the marginal WTP of restoration attributes using 
the ML model, shown in Table 9.5, are largely similar to those from the WCL model. 
As with the WCL model, WTP for boulders, wetland and nutrient reduction are 
significant across all combinations of land ownership and distance. However, the 
results in Table 9.5 for public premiums and distance decay of boulders and wetland 
have slight differences. For example, the public premium for wetlands is significant 
within both a short and far drive. Further, distance decay is only significant for 
boulders for restorations on private land within a far drive. Despite these differences, 





their neighborhood regardless of land ownership, but care more about public streams 
that are within driving distance. 
Table 9.5: Marginal WTP of Restoration Attributes for Mixed Logit Model 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Walk Short Drive Far Drive Walk - Short 
Drive 
Walk - Far 
Drive 
Boulders      
   Public 141.84*** 126.90*** 140.40*** 14.94 1.44 
   Private 125.02*** 104.16*** 81.73*** 20.86 43.29*** 
   Public-Private 16.82 22.73 58.67***   
Wetland      
   Public 127.15*** 125.67*** 122.48*** 1.48 4.67 
   Private 113.88*** 97.42*** 84.59*** 16.47 29.29** 
   Public-Private 13.27 28.25** 37.89**   
Nutrients      
   Public 2.90*** 3.30*** 2.80*** -0.40 0.10 
   Private 2.55*** 1.76*** 2.04*** 0.79* 0.51 
   Public-Private 0.35 1.54*** 0.76*   
Forest      
   Public 9.74 29.80*** 32.19*** -20.06 -22.45 
   Private 0.96 27.18*** 8.48 -26.23* -7.52 
   Public-Private 8.78 2.61 23.71   
Meadow      
   Public -1.53 23.33* 25.58** -24.86 -27.11 
   Private -38.04*** 15.22 9.42 -53.26*** -47.46*** 
   Public-Private 36.51** 8.12 16.16   
Observations 11976 11976 11976 11976 11976 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Note: There are 3992 usable choice sets included in the regression, with three choices per choice set. 
 
Results from Tables 9.4 through 9.6 have two main policy implications 
regarding stream restoration. First, our findings suggest that people place 
considerable value on improvements in stream appearance and nutrient reduction, but 
less so on changes to streamside vegetation. Policy makers might combine this 
finding with cost information for proposed projects to determine if the benefits are 
significant enough to warrant the alteration of the riparian zone. Notably, many past 





degraded streams. Our findings suggest that such alterations may be warranted if they 
are an efficient way to reduce erosion and nutrients, but that they do not bring 
considerable value on their own. In general, our findings suggest that policy makers 
may want to prioritize measures that improve stream appearance and nutrient 
reduction, and focus less on expected ancillary benefits from the alteration of the 
landscape. 
Table 9.6: Marginal WTP of Restoration Attributes for Conditional Logit Model 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Walk Short Drive Far Drive Walk - Short 
Drive 
Walk - Far 
Drive 
Boulders      
   Public 147.44*** 131.39*** 140.65*** 16.05 6.79 
   Private 129.59*** 110.15*** 85.35*** 19.44 44.24** 
   Public-Private 17.85 21.24 55.30***   
Wetland      
   Public 134.29*** 129.96*** 125.74*** 4.33 8.55 
   Private 114.45*** 102.12*** 84.56*** 12.33 29.89* 
   Public-Private 19.83 27.84* 41.17**   
Nutrients      
   Public 2.67*** 3.09*** 2.84*** -0.42 -0.17 
   Private 2.43*** 1.66*** 2.17*** 0.77* 0.26 
   Public-Private 0.24 1.43*** 0.67   
Forest      
   Public 10.84 27.61** 30.91*** -16.77 -20.07 
   Private -1.79 16.25 1.91 -18.03 -3.69 
   Public-Private 12.63 11.37 29.01*   
Meadow      
   Public -1.05 21.82 19.59 -22.87 -20.63 
   Private -38.42*** 9.90 4.61 -48.31*** -43.03** 
   Public-Private 37.37** 11.93 14.98   
Observations 11976 11976 11976 11976 11976 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Note: There are 3992 usable choice sets included in the regression, with three choices per choice set. 
 
Second, although people have a significant WTP for changes in stream 
appearance across all combinations of land ownership and distance, there are 





differences in value between restorations on public versus private land, officials may 
want to consider whether the considerable extra costs associated with purchasing 
easements or obtaining the rights to build on private land is worth it. Most existing 
restorations have been placed on streams going through public land or through 
properties where access to land can be gained at a low cost. Our results support this 
practice, finding that in addition to lower costs of access, restorations on public land 
bring significantly higher value. On the other hand, the high WTP for streambank 
stabilization and nutrient reduction in all situations suggests that policy makers may 
be justified in restoring streams on private land as may become a requirement in the 
near future. Further, because WTP is significant for stream appearance and nutrient 
reduction even at far distances, decision makers could create value from stream 
restoration in less densely populated areas.  
 
9.6. Conclusion 
TMDL requirements have required local and state governments to allocate 
considerable financial resources to improve water quality, particularly from urban 
stormwater runoff. Policy makers often have to consider that a large portion of the 
land in highly developed areas is privately owned and that improving water quality 
requires restoration on private land. This makes it essential to know how benefits 
from stream restoration vary between private and public land. In this study, we 
estimate the household WTP of several different stream restoration attributes on 





We find that comparing the value of restoration on public and private land 
depends both on which attributes are changed and how far away the restoration 
occurs from households. We find that boulders, wetlands and pollution reduction are 
all valued significantly on both private and public land. These attributes also display 
considerable variation in WTP across different levels of land ownership and distance. 
For example, using boulders for bank stabilization on public land within walking 
distance has a WTP that is almost twice as high compared to using boulders on 
private land that is a far drive away. In contrast, the near-stream vegetation attributes 
are less economically significant. Within walking distance on private land, 
households actually have a significant negative WTP for meadow. 
We also find significant heterogeneity in WTP for stream restoration attributes 
across different levels of land ownership and distance to a stream. Boulders and 
wetlands exhibit significant public premiums within driving distance but not within 
walking distance. We also find that, for stream stabilization attributes, distance decay 
occurs on private land but not on public land. Taken together, these results suggest 
that households have a similar WTP for stream restorations between public and 
private land in their neighborhoods, but have a public premium for far away 
restorations. Finally, we find that the addition of a meadow exhibits a significant 
public premium within walking distance but not within driving distance. 
Our findings about WTP of stream restoration attributes across combinations 
of land ownership and distance play an important role in policy decisions about where 
to restore streams. When combined with detailed project cost information, the WTP 





prove most beneficial. In particular, our findings suggest that policy makers may want 
to prioritize stream restorations that improve streambank stabilization and nutrient 
reduction. Although changes in riparian vegetation may have a valuable influence on 
erosion and pollution, they do not bring significant value by themselves.  
Further, it is clear that to satisfy water quality regulations such as the TMDL 
requirements and NPDES permits for stormwater management, local governments 
must find cost effective ways to use both public and privately owned land. Costs of 
projects may differ substantially for projects on public and private land, and the cost-
effectiveness of achieving nutrient goals will likely vary across the landscape. To 
some extent, the issue of private land can be dealt with by using rebates for voluntary 
household BMPs, such as rain gardens and rain barrels (Thurston et al. 2010; Ando 
and Freitas 2011; Newburn and Alberini 2016). However, given the extent of 
degradation in urban streams, and future plans to restore them, it is essential to know 
when residents have substantial WTP for restoration on public and private land. Our 
findings show that although several attributes of restorations are valued considerably 
on private land, the WTP for these attributes is sometimes significantly higher when 
on public land. Whether policy makers want to restore private streams or streams in 
sparsely populated areas, they will want to consider heterogeneity in WTP in addition 










Chapter 10: Stream Restoration Survey 
10.1. Additional Survey Response Statistics 
The following section provides a more in-depth analysis of survey respondents than is 
provided in chapter nine. Table 10.1 provides survey response rates for each of the 
three regions in the Baltimore metropolitan area that were included in the sample. As 
explained above, the sample was stratified so that 50% of the letters were mailed to 
households in Baltimore County within the URDL and the remaining 50% were split 
evenly between Baltimore County outside the URDL and Baltimore City. However, 
only 18.9% of the total usable choice experiments came from respondents from 
Baltimore City and 34.2% came from respondents from outside the URDL. This 
means that households in Baltimore City had a below average response rate compared 
to the entire sample and the region outside the URDL had an above average response 
rate. In chapter nine, we use probability weights to estimate population-level 
parameters in our choice model based on observable characteristics of respondents. 
Thus we assume that any differences in response rates observed between the three 
stratified regions can be explained by observable characteristics. 
Table 10.1: Survey Respondents by Sampling Region 










Respondents (#) 191 479 347 1017 
Usable Choice Experiments (#) 757 1877 1370 4004 
Usable Choice Experiments (%) 18.9 46.9 34.2 100 
Full Sample (# of Households) 2750 5500 2750 11000 






We now consider if there are any systematic differences in observable 
characteristics between survey respondents and non-respondents. To account for such 
differences, chapter nine uses a probit regression model to predict response 
probabilities for each respondent that are then included as probability weights in 
estimating a conditional logit model. In table 10.2, we provide differences in means 
of various household characteristics for all survey respondents and non-respondents 
with available data. The table further motivates the importance of controlling for non-
response bias in chapter nine. First we look at differences in parcel characteristics. On 
average, survey respondents have significantly larger parcels and houses. 
Respondents also have houses of higher structural quality on average. Notably, 
differences in structural quality do not result from differences in structure age. 
Further, the years in which structures were built are similar between respondents and 
non-respondents. Next we look at differences in surrounding land use for households 
included in the survey. Respondents tend to have more surrounding forest and 
agricultural land and less surrounding developed land than non-respondents. This 
difference corresponds with the higher response rate of households outside of the 
URDL. Finally, there are several significant differences between the two groups in 
census tract-level demographic variables. Respondents tend to live in census tracts 
with a higher proportion of householders with a bachelor’s degree. They also tend to 
be in census tracts with higher average incomes, fewer unemployed householders, 
and fewer minority heads of household. It is important to note that many of these 
variables are correlated. Thus only a few coefficients from the probit model in chapter 





Table 10.2: Sample Means for Survey Respondents and Non-Respondents 
     





Parcel-level housing characteristics     
Lot size (acres) 0.587 0.788 -0.201 6.84e-10 
House size (1000 sq ft) 1.800 1.992 -0.192 2.91e-09 
Structure Quality     
 Low 0.455 0.293 0.162 3.66e-23 
 Good 0.532 0.693 -0.161 9.04e-23 
 Very good 0.0128 0.0138 -0.00103 0.782 
Year Structure Built     
 Before 1950 0.260 0.253 0.00649 0.654 
 1950-1975 0.400 0.380 0.0204 0.205 
 1975-2000 0.260 0.274 -0.0141 0.330 
 2000-present 0.0799 0.0927 -0.0128 0.155 
Surrounding land use/land cover     
Proportion forest within 1 mile of household 0.235 0.285 -0.0495 1.05e-15 
Proportion agricultural within 1 mile of household 0.0725 0.0963 -0.0238 4.08e-7 
Proportion highly developed within 1 mile of 
household 
0.230 0.184 0.0453 1.15e-14 
Distance to public land (miles) 0.304 0.330 -0.0260 0.0312 
Distance to stream (miles) 0.232 0.228 0.00358 0.500 
Census tract-level demographics     
Head of household has bachelors proportion 0.417 0.486 -0.0687 8.38e-24 
Median household income ($1000) 79.54 88.82 -9.283 2.36e-14 
Not worked in past year proportion 0.194 0.181 0.0130 7.28e-09 
Head of household racial minority proportion 0.340 0.240 0.100 1.36e-21 
Age of head of household 53.30 53.88 -0.577 7.76e-5 
Household size 2.533 2.528 0.00526 0.515 
Observations 9,937 1,014   
 
We can only make direct comparisons of household characteristics between 
respondents and non-respondents as we do in table 10.2 when data are available for 
both groups. We also included many supplementary questions in the survey itself. 
Table 10.3 provides percentages of the various responses of survey respondents to 
certain demographic questions. Interestingly, a large portion of respondents to the 





survey than females. Of all respondents, 74% are white and 12% are African 
American. Respondents are also very likely to be in higher income brackets. A large 
percentage of respondents live in households with a total income above $150,000. 
Finally, respondents tend to be highly educated. About 70% of respondents have at 
least a bachelor’s degree.  









Age Group   Income   
< 30 1.2 <25K 1.9 
30-39 10.7 25-49K 7.9 
40-49 16.3 50-74K 11.4 
50-59 27.3 75-99K 11.1 
60-69 26.9 100-124K 13.5 
>70 14.6 125-149K 8.6 
Prefer not to say 3.0 >150K 21.6 
Total 100 Prefer not to Say 23.9 
Gender   Total 100 
Female 41.5 Recent Restoration 
Male 54.8 Yes 16.7 
Prefer not to say 3.7 No 38.0 
Total 100 Not Sure 45.3 
Race   Total 100 
American Indian 0.3 Education Level 
Asian 2.2 No HS 0.3 
African American 11.7 High School 14.5 
Hispanic 0.6 Technical School 5.0 
Mixed Race 1.8 2 year degree 10.1 
White 73.6 Bachelors 32.2 
Other 1.7 Advanced Degree 38.0 
Prefer not to say 8.1 Total 100 
Total 100.00   
 
 The next two tables summarize the responses of survey respondents to self-





frequently respondents perform several different outdoor recreation activities. We 
find that 21.6% of respondents walk, run or bike to a public park at least once per 
week. Similarly, 14.28% of respondents drive to a public park at least once a week. In 
contrast, the average respondent visits the Chesapeake Bay less frequently. In fact, 
many respondents never visit the Chesapeake Bay at all for recreation. This is likely 
because only a small proportion of respondents live in very close proximity to the 
Bay. We cannot compare these behavioral characteristics with the entire sample 
population as we did with the characteristics in table 10.2. However, the results in 
table 10.4 suggest that the survey did not only attract outdoor recreationalists. To 
some extent, this solidifies the finding in chapter nine that distance decay in WTP 
seems to be due to non-use factors. Table 10.5 summarizes the responses of survey 
respondents to questions that asked about their priorities towards various regional 
water quality goals. We find that each of the priorities we asked about are “very 
important” to most respondents. Respondents are most likely to find improvements in 
infrastructure to be a “very important” priority and are least likely to find erosion 
control to be a “very important” priority. People were most likely to find mosquito 






































I walk, run or bike to a 
public park in my 
neighborhood 39.21 10.29 15.31 12.51 12.91 8.69 1.07 
I drive to a public park in 
my neighborhood or an 
adjacent neighborhood 
19.58 19.63 27.25 18.46 11.06 3.22 0.80 
I visit regional or state 
parks (e.g., Gunpowder, 
Patapsco State Park) 
17.18 35.14 29.57 10.61 5.39 1.60 0.50 
I visit the Chesapeake Bay 
for water-related activities 
(e.g., boating, fishing, 
swimming, kayaking) 38.54 34.82 17.46 4.50 3.00 1.30 0.40 
I visit the Chesapeake Bay 
for waterfront recreation 
activities (e.g., picnicking, 
birdwatching, walking, 








































Reduce water pollution going into the 
Chesapeake Bay 0.30 0.60 3.42 18.11 76.87 0.70 
Reduce water pollution going into the 
Baltimore Harbor 0.40 0.80 3.72 16.81 77.57 0.70 
Improve wildlife habitat in the areas 
near streams 0.50 1.55 6.72 22.40 67.63 1.20 
Improve quality of drinking water 
supply in the Baltimore region 0.40 1.10 4.90 14.86 77.25 1.50 
Reduce sewer pipe leaks and 
infrastructure damage to roads, 
bridges and paths 0.10 0.30 2.35 13.96 82.29 1.00 
Reduce erosion along the stream 
banks 0.50 1.20 7.42 26.27 63.54 1.07 
Reduce mosquito populations that 
live near streams 1.00 2.60 8.92 18.46 66.66 2.37 
Remove trash left in and along 














10.2. Survey Instrument Example 
 
 
Thank you for participating in this survey!  The University of Maryland is conducting 
this survey to understand opinions about stream restoration and to inform local 
agencies and citizen groups about what design features of stream restoration are most 
desirable. Please answer all of the questions you can, but you are not required to do 
so. Please read the background information and then complete the survey. The survey 




Why are we concerned about the water quality of streams in our 
area? 
Urban and suburban development in the Baltimore area has been extensive over the 
past century. Although the roads, houses, driveways and other landscape changes 
necessary for development bring many benefits to citizens, they also have some 
unintended impacts. The following photographs and captions explain the impacts on 





Impervious surfaces in urban areas include roads, rooftops, parking lots and 
driveways. These hard surfaces do not absorb rainwater during storms.  








Impervious surface from urban and suburban development may increase streamflow 


































Streambank erosion can cause infrastructure damage to sewer pipes, leading to 








Increased water pollution going into local streams, lakes and the Chesapeake Bay 









Increases in algae can reduce oxygen in water bodies, leading to “dead zones” where 

































Section A. Stream Restoration 
 
A1. Before taking this survey, how familiar were you with the idea of stream 
restoration projects? 
 
[ ] Very familiar 
[ ] Moderately familiar 
[ ] Somewhat familiar  
[ ] Not familiar  
 
A2. Before taking this survey, how familiar were you with the issue of water 
pollution in local streams and the Chesapeake Bay watershed? 
 
[ ] Very familiar 
[ ] Moderately familiar 
[ ] Somewhat familiar  
[ ] Not familiar  
 
A3. Has there recently been a stream restoration project completed within walking 
distance of your home? 
 
[ ] Yes 
[ ] No 


























What are stream restorations and how can they help with water 
quality and infrastructure protection?  
Stream restoration projects alter the structure of urban streams, their banks and 
surrounding areas in order to mitigate these negative impacts from urban and 
suburban development. Stream restoration absorbs nutrients and stabilizes stream 
banks, which leads to less erosion. This in turn improves water quality in the 
Chesapeake Bay and reduces potential damage to infrastructure, such as sewer pipes, 





This stream restoration project included replacement of a concrete-lined stormwater 
ditch with a natural streambed lined with large stones along the stream. The mowed 
grass was replaced by a meadow with native grasses and bushes to absorb nutrients 
and provide wildlife habitat. 
 
 
How does the government decide whether to restore a stream? 
The State of Maryland, including Baltimore City and Baltimore County, are legally 
required to reduce water pollution entering waterways and the Chesapeake Bay. Local 
governments must come up with strategies for reducing water pollution and its 
damaging effects on the Bay, and stream restoration is one strategy that has been 
strongly considered as a local approach. Stream restorations are also built to reduce 









Section B. Your Neighborhood 
 
B1. How long have you lived in your neighborhood? 
 
[ ] less than a year 
[ ] 1-3 years 
[ ] 3-5 years 
[ ] 5-10 years 
[ ] more than 10 years 
 
 
B2. Do you rent or own the residence where you currently live? 
 
[ ] rent 




































Section C. Your Recreational Activities  
 
C1. For each statement below, please select the response that most accurately 
















I walk, run or bike to 
a public park in my 
neighborhood 1 2 3 4 5 6 
I drive to a public 
park in my 
neighborhood or an 
adjacent 
neighborhood 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
I visit regional or 
state parks (e.g., 
Gunpowder, Patapsco 
State Park) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
I visit the 





1 2 3 4 5 6 
I visit the 

























Important Not Sure 
Reduce water 
pollution going into 
the Chesapeake Bay 
1 2 3 4 5 N/A 
Reduce water 
pollution going into 
the Baltimore Harbor 
1 2 3 4 5 N/A 
Improve wildlife 
habitat in the areas 
near streams 
1 2 3 4 5 N/A 
Improve quality of 
drinking water supply 
in the Baltimore 
region 
1 2 3 4 5 N/A 
Reduce sewer pipe 
leaks and 
infrastructure damage 
to roads, bridges and 
paths 
1 2 3 4 5 N/A 
Reduce erosion along 
the stream banks 1 2 3 4 5 N/A 
Reduce mosquito 
populations that live 
near streams 
1 2 3 4 5 N/A 
Remove trash left in 


















Section D. Choosing Options for Proposed Stream Restoration Projects 
The pictures below provide background information about the design features of 
stream restoration and how each feature impacts degraded streams. Please look 
carefully at each feature because the next four questions will ask you to choose 
between stream restoration projects with different combinations of these features.  
 
Access to Stream Restoration 
Publicly Accessible 
 
Streams often pass through public land such as parks, schools or along roads. When 
stream restorations are located on public land, anyone can visit them. 
 
Not Publicly Accessible 
 
Streams often pass through private property and are generally not accessible by the 
public. When stream restorations are placed on private property, only the property 
owner has access to the direct benefits of stream restoration but some indirect benefits 








Proximity to Stream Restoration 
 
Streams are widely distributed throughout the Baltimore region. The location of a 
restoration project may be proposed for a stream at varying distances from your 
home. For this survey, three categories are used to describe the distance of the stream 
restoration from your home: 
• stream in walking distance from your home (within 1 miles),  
• stream in driving distance from your home (1 to 5 miles away) and  











































A stream restoration project may include creation of a meadow planted with native 
grasses and shrubs. This can help to provide sunlight and space for walking around or 





A stream restoration project may include trees on site (either planting new trees or 
retaining old mature trees). Trees can help to provide shade and create a quieter 










Appearance of Stream 
No Changes Made 
 
If left unprotected, the stream bank will continue to be eroded and further degraded. 
This can lead to potential infrastructure damage to sewer pipes and leakage of 
untreated sewage into streams.   
 
 
Boulders and Stones 
 
Stream restoration projects sometimes feature placement of boulders and stones along 
the stream banks to reduce stream bank erosion and protect sewer lines and other 











Wetlands may be created to include low grassy areas that improve wildlife habitat 
and reduce nutrient pollution and erosion. However, the wet ground may make the 































Stream & Bay Pollution Reduced 
Stream restorations help to achieve water pollution reductions that are legally 
mandated for local streams and the Chesapeake Bay. The map below shows the 16 
separate water zones for Baltimore County and City. Each stream restoration project 
will meet some percentage of the yearly water pollution reduction goal in one of 













D1. Restoration projects A and B are two possible options to restore a 1000 foot 
section of a degraded stream (about the length of 3 football fields). The “current 
situation” means no restoration project will be done at this stream location and no 
costs are expended. The stream is publicly accessible (at a park, school, or along the 
road) and within walking distance of your home (within a mile). Which of the three 
options below would you vote for?   
 
Please consider this as if it were a real world example. This is not currently related to 
any ballot issue that you will vote for in any election, but it could be informative for 


















This stream is publicly accessible (At a park, school, or along the road) 




Forest and Meadow 
Mixed 










No Changes Made 
Erosion and infrastructure 
damage will worsen 
 





Provides wildlife habitat, 
reduces erosion 




Meets 0% of goal for 
water zone 
For yearly pollution 
reduction 
Meets 50% of goal for 
water zone 
For yearly pollution 
reduction 
Meets 10% of goal for 
water zone 













D2. Now assume a similar stream at a different location is proposed for a stream 
restoration. The stream is not publicly accessible (on someone’s private property) 
and driving distance from your home (1 to 5 miles away). Restoration projects C and 
D are two possible options to restore a 1000 foot section of the degraded stream 
(about the length of 3 football fields). The “current situation” means no restoration 
project will be done at this location and no cost expended. Which of the three options 





















This stream is not publicly accessible (on someone’s private property) 




Forest and Meadow 
Mixed 





Forest and Meadow 
Mixed 





No Changes Made 
Erosion and infrastructure 
damage will worsen 
 




No Changes Made 
Erosion and infrastructure 
damage will worsen 
 




Meets 0% of goal for 
water zone 
For yearly pollution 
reduction 
Meets 10% of goal for 
water zone 
For yearly pollution 
reduction 
Meets 25% of goal for 
water zone 













D3. Now assume a similar stream at a different location is proposed for a stream 
restoration. The stream is not publicly accessible (on someone’s private property) 
and within walking distance of your home (within a mile). Restoration projects E 
and F are two possible options to restore a 1000 foot section of the degraded stream 
(about the length of 3 football fields). The “current situation” means no restoration 
project will be done at this location and no cost expended. Which of the three options 




















This stream is not publicly accessible (on someone’s private property) 




Forest and Meadow 
Mixed 
Land left as it is 
 
Forest and Meadow 
Mixed 








No Changes Made 
Erosion and infrastructure 
damage will worsen 
 





Provides wildlife habitat, 
reduces erosion 




Meets 0% of goal for 
water zone 
For yearly pollution 
reduction 
Meets 10% of goal for 
water zone 
For yearly pollution 
reduction 
Meets 50% of goal for 
water zone 













D4. Now assume a similar stream at a different location is proposed for a stream 
restoration. The stream is publicly accessible (at a park, school, or along the road) 
and driving distance from your home (1 to 5 miles away). Restoration projects G and 
H are two possible options to restore a 1000 foot section of the degraded stream 
(about the length of 3 football fields). The “current situation” means no restoration 
project will be done at this location and no cost expended. Which of the three options 



















This stream is publicly accessible (At a park, school, or along the road) 




Forest and Meadow 
Mixed 
Land left as it is 
 
Forest and Meadow 
Mixed 
Land left as it is 
 
Meadow  




No Changes Made 
Erosion and infrastructure 
damage will worsen 
 
No Changes Made 
Erosion and infrastructure 
damage will worsen 
 
Wetland Added 
Provides wildlife habitat, 
reduces erosion 




Meets 0% of goal for 
water zone 
For yearly pollution 
reduction 
Meets 20% of goal for 
water zone 
For yearly pollution 
reduction 
Meets 30% of goal for 
water zone 













Section E. Attitudes and Knowledge 




Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
Agree 
Protecting the Chesapeake 
Bay is important to me 
personally 
1 2 3 4 5 
Reducing environmental 
degradation and 
improving the appearance 
of streams, paths and 
public green spaces in my 
neighborhood is important 
to me 

































Section F. Demographic Information 
 
F1. What is your age?  
 
[ ] Less than 30 
[ ] 30 to 39  
[ ] 40 to 49 
[ ] 50 to 59 
[ ] 60 to 69 
[ ] 70 or over  
[ ] Prefer not to say 
 
F2. What is your gender?  
 
[ ] Female  
[ ] Male 
[ ] Prefer Not to Say 
 
F3. What is your racial or ethnic group? Check all boxes that apply. 
 
[ ] White  
[ ] Black or African American 
[ ] Hispanic 
[ ] American Indian or Alaskan Native 
[ ] Asian 
[ ] Mixed Race 
[ ] Other 
[ ] Prefer Not to Say 
 
F4. Please indicate the highest level of education you have completed. Please select 
one answer. 
 
[ ] No high school degree 
[ ] High school degree or GED 
[ ] Technical or trade school graduate 
[ ] Two-year college degree  
[ ] Four-year college degree (BA, BS) 
[ ] Advanced degree (MA, MS, PhD, JD, MBA, etc.) 
 
F5. How many people (including yourself) live in your household? 
 








F6. How many children (0-18 years old) are living in your household at least 50% of 
the time? 
 
    
   
 
 
F7. Please indicate your household’s total gross annual income. Please include all 
sources of income.   
 
[ ] less than $25,000 
[ ] $25,000 to $49,999 
[ ] $50,000 to $74,999 
[ ] $75,000 to $99,999 
[ ] $100,000 to $124,999 
[ ] $125,000 to $149,999  
[ ] $150,000 or more  
[ ] Prefer not to say 
 
 
F8. Have you ever belonged to or donated to any environmental group or watershed 
association? 
[ ] Yes 



























Thank you for participating in this survey.   
You are now eligible to participate in a raffle to potentially win an Amazon gift card.  









Please check the box below if you would like to opt out of the raffle. 
Do NOT include me in the raffle 
  
If you would like to receive a copy of the final report this study, please enter your 
email address below: 
 
 
This study has been approved by the Institutional Review Board at the University of 
Maryland. Should you have any concerns about the study, feel free to contact Andrew 
Rosenberg at arosenb5@umd.edu or (410) 302-2013. Please be assured that all 
information you have provided will remain confidential. 
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